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Introduction
The concept of absence of arbitrage is a cornerstone of modern nance. It
implies that nancial gain cannot be derived from nothing or in simpler
terms, an asset with higher expected returns is riskier. The no-arbitrage
condition implies the existence of a pricing kernel that precisely reects
the pricing information of all assets. From the stipulation, it follows that
the price of an asset is equal to its pricing kernel-weighted payos. In
fact, the realizations of the pricing kernel vary in response to economic
situations such as a recession or a boom. Typically, during a recession,
when the value of money is higher, the pricing kernel has a higher value
than during a boom. Classical nance theories such as the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) equate good and bad economic conditions with
high and low equity market returns respectively. This, in turn, implies
that the pricing kernel is declining in market returns. However, estima-
tions of higher-order moments in CAPM models on equity returns show
that the pricing kernel is U-shaped; see Dittmar (2002), Pot (2006) and
Post et al. (2008), that is, it increases with positive returns. This nding
thus contradicts the classical nance theory.
The rst article mainly investigates whether the upward slope in the
U-shaped pricing kernel is merely a statistical artifact. To determine
this, dierent functional forms of the pricing kernel are estimated on
the basis of the generalized method of moments (GMM). The estimated
polynomial pricing kernel for three of the ve datasets is U-shaped with
a clear increasing region. In these three datasets, the observed average
asset returns are better explained by the U-shaped pricing kernels. This
v
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shape is robust for dierent time windows. Instead of polynomials, es-
timating the kernels with other functional forms that do not exclude a
U-shape by construction also yields a U-shaped kernel. However, be-
cause the upward slopes are not statistically signicant, these ndings
may not succeed in persuading advocates of standard economic theory
to change their viewpoints.
In the rst article, asset returns are assumed to be exogenous. In re-
ality, though, assets are never wholly intangible; they are backed by real
companies that grow and evolve with time. Empirical evidence shows
that rm characteristics change throughout the various phases of evolu-
tion that is, they follow a life cycle. Young rms are more prone to risk.
They encounter greater challenges in gaining access to credit markets
and therefore often reinvest their earnings. At the same time, they place
greater emphasis on innovation and have a faster growth curve. Large
companies, however, tend to be risk-averse, less exible, and slower in
growth. However, because of their slower pace of growth, they have free
cash ows to pay out as dividends. The second article captures these ob-
servations and presents them in a simple life cycle model. The following
assumptions generate the described life cycle features in the model: de-
creasing marginal productivity, that is, an inverse relationship between
rm capital and productivity, relative to the rm size; over proportional
negative exogenous random shocks to small rms; and lack of access to
external nance sources. Overproportional shocks to small rms result
in a complex relationship between rm size, expected return and volatil-
ity. With larger rms, a so-called leverage eect can be observed: a drop
in the value of a company increases the volatility of the returns of it.
With small and medium-sized rms, a value eect is observed: on an
average, companies with high book values yield higher returns because
the high book value helps absorb the negative shocks. Naturally, the
higher chance of survival also makes companies with more capital more
valuable. With the help of business cycles, the life cycle model also ex-
plains IPO waves, procyclical investment behavior, and countercyclical
default probabilities.
The second article also explores whether intervention by a central
bank can help the small constrained rms. Findings reveal that in the
absence of access to external nance, an interest rate policy introduced
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by the central bank oers little assistance. The interest rate policy has
negligible impact on the buer against negative shocks that constrained
rms attempt to build by saving a considerable part of the capital. Con-
sequently, the investment behavior remains unchanged. The only reme-
dial measure for these constrained companies is acquiring access to the
credit markets. However, agency conicts are one of the main reasons
that prevent many companies from securing sucient credit, and in most
cases, they cannot be easily resolved through regulations.
The last article employs the dividend process from the second arti-
cle in an evolutionary market model. In this model, several investment
strategies start with a sum of initial wealth and compete against each
other. The study aims to identify the strategy that can not only sur-
vive but also outperform the other strategies in the market. The model
assumes three dividend-based stages of life cycles. IPOs are essentially
newly founded rms that pay no dividends. They evolve into startups,
which are small rms, in the subsequent period and pay a few dividends.
Startups face a higher risk of default but also stand to grow into a con-
cern. Concerns, on the other hand, pay out large dividends and face a
low default risk. Every economic period witnesses the birth of new IPOs
and defaults. Dierent investment strategies compete in an evolutionary
market with these three types of assets. High-performing strategies nat-
urally gain more wealth shares than low-performing ones. The success
of a strategy depends not only on its ability to predict the dividends,
which follow a life cycle, but also on the other strategies in the market.
A surviving strategy for innitely lived assets is a generalized Kelly
rule, a strategy that maximizes the long-term growth of wealth. Simu-
lation results from the third article, which also discusses non-innitely
lived assets following life cycles, are in agreement with this nding. A
novel nding of this article is that strategies that predict the dividend
process of a rm on the basis of those of other similar rms perform bet-
ter and gain more wealth shares. Because events such as defaults occur
once in the lifetime of a rm, past realization of the dividends of that
rm reveal almost nothing about a default. Lack of sucient data his-
tory for predicting the dividend process can lead to a situation wherein
simplistic strategies perform better than an estimated generalized Kelly
rule. Given that a default is a rare event, it takes considerably long for
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the generalized Kelly rule to dominate the market.
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Article 1
Is the Pricing Kernel
U-Shaped?
Abstract: There is strong empirical evidence that the pricing kernel is U-shaped,
which provides a way to explain the substantial coskewness premium. Existing studies
typically use a polynomial approximation of the pricing kernel. Problematically, these
polynomials have, in most cases, increasing parts by construction. Therefore, it is
not clear whether the increasing parts are an artifact of the chosen functional form.
Taking this concept into consideration, this paper shows that pricing kernels, as
estimated by the generalized method of moments on equity data, are still U-shaped
and that the increasing part is not a statistical artifact. This conclusion derives
from the fact that the functional form of kernels, which allows for strictly decreasing
kernels as well as for kernels with increasing parts, is still U-shaped. These results
arise from checking for higher order polynomials, various time horizons, and dierent
functional forms of the kernel.
1.1 Introduction
In the absence of arbitrage, a pricing kernel exists such that the price of
an asset is equal to its pricing kernel-weighted payos. However, the no-
arbitrage condition provides no information about the shape of the kernel
(besides that of non-negativity). In equilibrium models with complete
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markets and a risk-averse representative agent who knows the probabili-
ties of all states of the world, the pricing kernel is high in states with low
resources because the marginal utility of one unit of additional consump-
tion is high. However, in states with many resources, the pricing kernel
is low. Therefore, the pricing kernel should decrease with resources.1 In
contradiction, there is, as shown in the following paragraphs, empirical
evidence that the kernel is U-shaped within a certain range. However,
studies such as those from Dittmar (2002), Pot (2006), and Post et al.
(2008) do not investigate whether these increasing parts are signicant.
This paper tries to ll this gap.
Empirical evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel can be
found in equity as well in option data. Estimating the kernel with eq-
uity returns yields a U-shaped pricing kernel, as Dittmar (2002), Pot
(2006), and Post et al. (2008) have shown by approximating the ker-
nel with a quadratic function or a higher order polynomial. The reason
underlying this shape is the coskewness of single assets with the mar-
ket portfolio returns (as a proxy for the available resources), such that
the three-moment extension of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
provides a signicant risk premium for coskewness (Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1976), Friend and Westereld (1980), Barone-Adesi (1985), Lim
(1989), Harvey and Siddique (2000), Errunza and Sy (2005) and Smith
(2007)). However, Dittmar (2002) and Post et al. (2008) show that the
observed coskewness premium can no longer be explained if nonsatiation,
risk aversion, and nonincreasing absolute risk aversion are imposed on
the utility function of the representative agent (thereby translating into
restrictions on the pricing kernel). Furthermore, Pot and Wang (2010)
showed that unconstrained quadratic or higher order kernels imply rela-
tive risk aversions of above ve for the representative investor, which is
generally considered to be implausible. The pricing kernel in the well-
known CAPM, discussed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin
(1966), is linear in relation to market returns, whereas the three-moment
CAPM extends this with a quadratic term. On extending the CAPM
by further moments, Fang and Lai (1997) and Hung (2008) found that
co-kurtosis is also a relevant pricing factor. Considering a third order
polynomial for the pricing, it still remains U-shaped in market returns,
1Suitable textbook references are Magill and Quinzii (1996) or Cochrane (2001).
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as shown by Dittmar (2002). Estimations of the kernel from equity data
clearly point to a U-shaped kernel.
Pricing kernel estimations done with option data also show a U-
shaped kernel around the current stock price. Prominent examples of
this are At-Sahalia and Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000), and Rosenberg
and Engle (2002). Note that estimating pricing kernels with option data
allows us to estimate the pricing kernel within a broader range of market
portfolio returns than is the case for equity data. The reason for this is
that options exist with quite extreme strike prices, whereas such extreme
values can rarely be observed in markets. Therefore, it turns out that
pricing kernels typically fall after an increasing part of the kernel. If the
view is restricted to the range of the kernel, which can be estimated by
equity data, the kernel estimated by option data has a U-shape. More
recent evidence is less clear: Detlefsen et al. (2007) estimated the ker-
nel for German data at several points in time; in some cases, he de-
rived a U-shape around the actual index level, and sometimes the kernel
was merely decreasing. In another work, Golubev et al. (2008) provide
some evidence that the increasing parts of kernels estimated using op-
tion prices are statistically signicant. However, by using an asymmetric
GJR-GARCH model with empirical innovations for option data, Barone-
Adesi et al. (2008) and Barone-Adesi and Dall'O (2010) showed that the
increasing parts of the kernel largely disappear.
In conclusion, there is empirical evidence for U-shaped kernels from
equity as well as from option data around the current market price.
Given that the estimations with equity data typically employ polyno-
mial kernels and particularly quadratic kernels, the pricing kernel, by
construction, has to be U-shaped (an inverse U-shape is also conceiv-
able). This leads to the question as to whether the increasing part of the
pricing kernel is merely a consequence of the polynomial functional form.
Another interesting question is whether many observations of market re-
turns are present in the increasing part. If not, then the increasing part
could be a meaningless artifact. Unfortunately, the existing literature
is not particularly helpful in addressing these concerns. For instance,
Dittmar (2002), Pot (2006) and Post et al. (2008) estimated kernels
with increasing parts and found that the coecients before the polyno-
mial terms were signicant. However, their studies did not locate the
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minimum of the kernel or the origin of the increasing part of the kernel.
Further, they do not provide any information on how often the economy
lies in the increasing part of the kernel. Other studies, such as Hansen
and Singleton (1982, 1983), and many subsequent works, have chosen a
functional form (typically a power utility) such that the pricing kernel
declines with any parameterization. More recently, Post and van Vliet
(2006) and De Giorgi and Post (2008) estimated pricing kernels based
on second-order stochastic dominance|and by that, assuming decreas-
ing kernels|and found that the pricing kernels are steep in losses and
at in gains. However, this approach is also unhelpful in answering the
question whether the pricing kernel is U-shaped. However, restricting
kernels to be decreasing would result in such at parts of the kernel.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to check whether the pric-
ing kernel has increasing parts and, if so, where these are. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows: First, it makes clear that the
increasing parts of the kernel are not an artifact of the polynomial func-
tional forms by estimating the kernel for functional forms, where the
kernel may be U-shaped or where it is not (i.e., the piecewise linear ker-
nel and the modied quadratic kernel, which starts at one point to be
linear). These various functional forms, furthermore, allow direct test-
ing for the increasing parts in the kernels. Second, estimating a higher
order polynomial kernel than the literature reveals also that the dataset,
including the Fama-French value, size, and momentum portfolios, has a
clearly U-shaped kernel, which was not the case with a quadratic kernel.
Following a large part of the previously cited literature, the kernel is
estimated on equity data by the generalized method of moments (GMM).
Following Post et al. (2008), the pricing kernel is assumed to be constant
over time. There are two main reasons for this: First, the question to be
answered in this paper is if the pricing kernel is persistently U-shaped.
Therefore, even if the pricing kernel is time varying, the focus is on the
shape of the kernel as an average over the long run. In line with that
is the usage of equity data, because the available data history is much
longer for them than for option data. Second, theory does not show how
the time variation of the kernel should be modeled. Taking, for example,
the equilibrium model provided later in this paper, the pricing kernel
depends only on the preferences of the representative agent. Given that
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the preferences remain roughly constant over time, the pricing kernel is
also. Furthermore, it is reasonable to choose a simple econometric model,
which is capable of modeling the main features but is only slightly mis-
specied, rather than a complicated one, where one cannot be certain
that it is even more misspecied. Concerning the results of the estima-
tions, the quadratic kernel turns out be U-shaped, in line with Dittmar
(2002), Pot (2006) and Post et al. (2008). Each of them estimates the
kernel on one dataset. To ensure robustness of the results, this paper es-
timates everything using ve dierent datasets. Additionally, this paper
quanties the eect of the increasing parts of the kernel further: For two
of these datasets, the kernel lies in the increasing region for more than
one-quarter of the total observed period. In the other three datasets,
the kernel lies in the increasing part for less than 2.5% of the observed
periods. These results demonstrate two things: the pricing kernel is
U-shaped, but the number of observations, when an increasing kernel
occurs, may vary substantially.
An obvious issue with a polynomial kernel, especially a quadratic
kernel, is that it almost automatically has increasing parts in it. There-
fore, it is interesting to see how well a kernel does that is restricted to be
decreasing. For example, Post et al. (2008) restricted the parameters of
the kernel in such a way that on all observed data, the kernel is falling.
With such an approach, the parameters may be strongly restricted: in
my dataset the observed market returns range from -0.29 to 0.384, but
95% of the market returns are observed between -0.105 and 0.1. If a
falling kernel is enforced in too large a range, the parameters of the
whole kernel in that setup are massively more restricted. This becomes
problematic if, as shown, only 5% of the observations can be found on
approximately one-half of the restricted range.
A further step for investigating the shape of the kernel is to restrict
the slope of the kernel to zero in increasing areas (as in Dittmar (2002)).
Since the kernels with the restricted and the unrestricted slope are not
in this way nested in each other, it is noteworthy that the nonincreasing
kernel ts the data worse than the kernel with the increasing parts.
However, this eect is less strong than in Dittmar (2002). Setting the
slope of the increasing parts to zero is one possible way, but might it be
better to restrict the slope to be smaller than another level, for example
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 0:01? An innovation of this paper is to estimate the level where the
slope of the kernel should be restricted: it turns out that this level, in
four out of ve datasets, is (insignicantly) positive. That is, even if the
functional form of the kernel explicitly allows for the increasing parts of
the kernel to be at, the estimation shows increasing parts.
A potential issue is the order of the polynomial; the literature, for
example Dittmar (2002) and Pot (2006), stops with pricing kernels of
order 3. This paper tests polynomials up to order 7. In four out of
our ve datasets, this is enough. However, in the fth dataset, the
Fama-French value, size, and momentum portfolios, a pricing kernel with
a polynomial of at least order 6 with a clear U-shape is appropriate.
Chung et al. (2006) and Nguyen and Puri (2009) showed that Fama-
French value, size, and momentum excess returns can be explained by a
higher-order polynomial of the market excess return; the resulting pricing
kernel is, therefore, a consequence of this. Because a polynomial of order
3 is sucient, if the momentum portfolios are not included, it can be
concluded that this eect can be attributed to the momentum portfolios.
Finally, a polynomial may not be the correct functional form of the
pricing kernel. To check this, a piecewise linear kernel is estimated. It
turns out that the estimated piecewise linear pricing kernel has approxi-
mately the same shape as the polynomial kernel, including its increasing
parts.
Overall, this paper shows, with an extremely broad range of dierent
tests, that the pricing kernels have a U-shape and that this shape is nei-
ther the result of a misspecied functional form nor a statistical artifact.
Nonetheless, one word of caution: the estimation of the kernel cannot
be done very precisely. The observed substantial variation between the
kernels estimated from the dierent datasets and the poor signicance of
most statistical tests demonstrate this. Nonetheless, estimations on ve
dierent datasets and over a time horizon of more than 80 years point to
a U-shape for the kernel. Hence one can be condent that the increasing
parts of the kernel exist and that they, therefore, should be taken into
account for asset pricing.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 1.2 pro-
vides the model framework and section 1.3 the estimation methodology.
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Section 1.4 describes the datasets, and the pricing kernels are estimated
and tested in section 1.5. The eects of these kernels on the utility
function of a rational, representative investor are shown in section 1.6.
Finally, section 1.7 presents the conclusions.
1.2 Model framework
No arbitrage implies the existence of some risk-neutral measure , such
that for all assets k, the expected return under  is the risk-free rate Rf
(Harrison and Kreps (1979))|that is,
Rf = E(Rk) for all assets k:
Let ps denote the physical probability of state s 2 f1; : : : ; Sg. Then,
Rf = E(Rk) =
SX
s=1
ps
s
ps
Rks =
SX
s=1
psLsR
k
s = EP (LRk); (1.1)
where Ls =
s
ps
is the pricing kernel.2 To keep notation simple, the
physical probability EP is, in the future, written as E. As Equation
(1.1) holds for any assets k and j, one has
0 = E
 
L  (Rk  Rj) ; (1.2)
and furthermore, because  and p are probabilities and L  0,
E(L) = 1: (1.3)
No arbitrage implies these conditions for the pricing kernel. Instead
of an unconditional expected value, a conditional expected value|that
is, 0 = E
 
L(Rk  Rj)j
t

, as in Dittmar (2002) and Pot (2006), for
example|can be used, where 
t is the information available in period t.
More precisely, 
t are the realizations of some random variables in t, on
2Often|for example, in Cochrane (2001)|the stochastic discount factor is used
instead of the pricing kernel. Both measures for the state prices dier in a (multi-
plicative) constant.
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which the conditional expected value is dened. How the conditioning
variables included in 
t should be chosen is unclear. Cochrane (2001, p.
145) summarized the issue as follows: \The situation is not repaired by
simple inclusion of some conditioning information. Models such as the
CAPM imply a conditional linear factor model with respect to investors'
information sets. However, the best we can hope to do is to test implica-
tions conditioned down on variables that we can observe and include in a
test. Thus, a conditional linear factor model is not testable." A possible
way to circumvent this is to take the expected value of the conditional
expected value
0 = E
 
E
 
L  (Rk  Rj)j
t

= E
 
L  (Rk  Rj) :
That is, the conditional model implies the unconditional one if the pricing
kernel, L, is constant over time. Thus, it can be concluded that the
unconditional model must hold, in any case, in the long run. While
this method is probably not the most ecient way to estimate a pricing
kernel, it relies on only a few assumptions, and the results cannot be
inuenced by wrongly chosen conditional variables.
1.2.1 Relation to the utility function of a represen-
tative investor
No arbitrage implies the existence of a positive pricing kernel. To obtain
more information on the shape of the pricing kernel and on which vari-
ables the kernel depends, an equilibrium model can be used. Consider a
two-period model in which a representative agent has initial wealth w0
and an increasing, strictly concave, and dierentiable utility function.
Then the representative agent maximizes his utility:
max
k
u(c0) + E(u(C));
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where  is the time discount. The maximization is done under the fol-
lowing budget constraints:
C = w0
 
KX
k=1
kR
k +
 
1 
KX
k=1
k
!
R0
!
c0 = w0
 
1 
KX
k=1
k
!
;
where c0 is consumption in the rst period, as given by the initial wealth
minus the investment, into a portfolio of assets where k is the portfolio
weight of asset k 2 f1; : : : ;Kg, and Cs is consumption in state s, given
by the payos of the portfolio bought in the rst period. Then the budget
constraints are inserted into the maximization problem. The rst-order
conditions of the utility maximization problem then imply for all assets
k
Rf = E


u0(C)
u0(c0)
Rk

:
A comparison with equation (1.1) immediately shows that the pricing
kernel is given by
L = 
u0(C)
u0(c0)
: (1.4)
In the previous model,  and c0 are constants. The likelihood ratio
process is, therefore, proportional to the marginal utility in the next
period. Further, it is falling in consumption because of the concave utility
function; that is, the increasing parts in the likelihood ratio process
cannot be explained by this model.
The estimated pricing kernel supports the model as long as the pricing
kernel is nonincreasing. However, empirical evidence shows that there
may be increasing parts in the pricing kernel (see, for example, At-
Sahalia and Lo (2000) for evidence from option data or Dittmar (2002)
for evidence based on equity data). In this situation, any assumption of
the model may be violated. For instance, Ziegler (2007) identies prob-
lems of aggregation, misestimated beliefs of the agents, Peso problems,
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and heterogeneous beliefs as possible reasons for the observed increas-
ing parts in the pricing kernel. However, several examples and some
empirical evidence show that none of these explanations may suce to
explain the observed increasing parts of the kernel under a reasonable
set of assumptions. Hens and Reichlin (2010) show, furthermore, with
simple examples that a nonconcave utility function of the representative
investor, incomplete markets, or heterogeneous beliefs may explain the
increasing parts in the kernel. In this setup, the latest solution seems to
be the best explanation since the other two possibilities need unrealistic
assumptions or the results are fragile if the parameters are changed a bit.
Over all, it is challenging to explain the increasing parts of the kernel
theoretically under plausible assumptions.
With the equilibrium argument above, the pricing kernel depends
on the consumption of the representative investor. This consumption
is typically approximated by the use of either aggregate consumption
or market portfolio return data. The latter source assumes that the
only source of income for an investor is his assets and that by market
clearing, the representative investor holds all assets in equilibrium and,
therefore, earns the market return. Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) have
shown that using market portfolio returns as a consumption proxy ex-
plains the observed risk premia (in a CAPM setup) much better than
does using aggregated consumption. The main competitor for market
portfolio returns|namely, aggregate consumption data from the Na-
tional Income and Products Accounts, which has been used by Hansen
and Singleton (1982) and many others|causes several problems. For ex-
ample, Breeden et al. (1989), Ferson and Harvey (1992), Wilcox (1992),
and Slesnick (1998) discuss measurement errors, denitional problems,
issues with seasonal adjustment, and other problems with the aggre-
gation of the consumption data over time. Furthermore, many behav-
ioral explanations|for example, narrow framing, loss aversion, or men-
tal accounting|demonstrate why wealth (or changes in it) should be
included in the utility function of the representative agent and also,
therefore, in the pricing kernel. St-Amour (2007) gives a short overview
of this literature. For example, Barberis and Huang (2006) and Hens and
Wohrmann (2006) demonstrated that the equity premium puzzle can be
explained in that way. For these reasons, the pricing kernel is chosen as
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a function of the market excess return: L(rm) with rm = R
M   Rf . A
side eect of this is that by subtracting the riskless rate, the kernel is
in real terms. This makes sense because the consumer is not interested
in his nominal wealth but in the amount of real consumption he can
aord with his wealth. Nonetheless, the impact of stochastic ination
on portfolio decisions may be complex, as demonstrated by Brennan and
Xia (2002) in a continuous time setup. The chosen approach tries, there-
fore, to keep the impact of stochastic ination on our results as small as
possible but does not claim to solve this issue.
1.2.2 Functional form of the pricing kernel
To test for increasing parts, kernels that can, but do not have to, contain
increasing parts are especially interesting. In the following, we consider
linear, polynomial, and piecewise linear kernels. The rst two types are
important since they are used in a large part of the literature. However,
many polynomial, and especially quadratic, kernels have the disadvan-
tage that almost by denition they have increasing parts. Because of
that, the piecewise linear kernels are also used.
In the CAPM, the pricing kernel is a linear function of market excess
return. Rubinstein (1973) showed that the CAPM can be considered as
a rst-order Taylor approximation of a representative investor with an
arbitrary utility function. A higher-order Taylor approximation of the
pricing kernel L = u0(C)=u0(c0) = u0(rm)=u0(c0) at the risk-free rate
(assuming that c0 is constant) has the following form:
L(rm) = h0 + h1u
00  rm + h2u000  r2m + h3u0000  r3m + : : :
The quadratic and cubic terms can be interpreted as preferences for
skewness and kurtosis. Typically, most people prefer positively skewed
distributions without fat tails; therefore, h2u
000 should be positive, and
h3u
0000 should be negative. The polynomial kernel is dened as
L(rm) = 0 + 1  rm + 2  r2m + 3  r3m + : : : = 0 +
X
j
i  rjm: (1.5)
This kernel has two advantages: it is extremely general (every continu-
ous function can be approximated by it) and it can be written in terms
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of linear factors, where rm; r
2
m; : : : are the factors. However, is a poly-
nomial the right type of function to approximate a pricing kernel? By
construction, a Taylor approximation describes a function well at the
point of approximation, but worsens the further it is away from that
point. To estimate the pricing kernel for large or small market returns,
other functional forms could potentially work better. An alternative is to
use a piecewise linear kernel with breakpoints q1; : : : ; qn, i.e., as follows:
L(rm) = 0 + 1rm +
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 for rm < q1
2(rm   q1) for q1  rm < q2
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2) for q2  rm < q3
...
...
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2)+
: : :+ n+1(rm   qn) for qn  rm:
(1.6)
The main advantage of this functional form is the enormous number
of possible shapes of the kernel. Post and van Vliet (2006) is one of
the few studies where a piecewise linear marginal utility function (i.e.,
in a representative agent model, a piecewise linear pricing kernel) has
been used. The authors mainly nd that the market portfolio is not
mean variance ecient but that third-order stochastic dominance seems
to hold for the market portfolio. Since they are focusing on a linear
program to check the stochastic dominance, they focus on decreasing
kernels. The main reason for the rare usage of the piecewise linear kernel
may be that the rst derivative in rm is not continuous in all points. For
the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, it is required
only that the piecewise linear pricing kernel is dierentiable in all  ,
which is obviously given. Nevertheless, for numerical optimization the
noncontinuous rst derivative of rm may be problematic. The estimation
methods are discussed in more detail in the next section.
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1.3 Estimation methods
In a further step, the pricing kernel must be estimated from data. This
can be done in various ways: Based on no-arbitrage, this step is especially
easy for a linear kernel, which can be determined out of the market
portfolio and the risk-free asset, and it is then identical with the famous
CAPM. If it is possible to represent the kernel in a linear form in factors,
then the kernel can be estimated via OLS regressions. More complicated
kernels may be estimated by GMM. All these estimation methods are
discussed in more detail in the following sections.
1.3.1 Benchmark CAPM
The CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) assumes
a linear pricing kernel L = ~0 + ~1rm with market excess return rm =
RM  Rf . This pricing kernel can easily be estimated out of the return
of the market portfolio and the riskless asset. Assuming that asset k in
equation (1.2) is the market portfolio and that asset j is the risk-free
rate, the following conditions are satised:
0 = E
 
L  (RM  Rf ) = ~0E(rm) + ~1E(r2m)
1 = E(L) = ~0 + ~1E(rm):
Solving this system of two linear equations for ~0 and ~1 results in the
following:
~0 =
E(r2m)
var(rm)
and ~1 =   E(rm)
var(rm)
: (1.7)
Plugging in the average and variance of past market portfolio excess re-
turns is the simplest way to estimate the parameters of a linear pricing
kernel. The advantage of this method of estimating a pricing kernel is
that it depends only on the risk-free rate and the return of the market
portfolio. Therefore, it does not depend on the returns of individual
assets. This is an advantage, because it is typically not feasible to in-
clude every single asset in the world in an empirical study; therefore, the
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choice of the assets to include may aect the results. For the rest of the
paper, this estimation method for a pricing kernel is referred to as the
benchmark CAPM model. The following two subsections describe two
additional methods for estimating more general pricing kernels.
1.3.2 Factor models
If pricing kernels are linear combinations of factors, they can be esti-
mated using linear factor models. The CAPM (or its higher moment
versions) or the Fama-French three-factor model are special cases of fac-
tor models. Furthermore, all the functional forms of the previous section
can be rewritten in factor form. Since a large part of the literature fo-
cuses on factor models and on the risk premia for the dierent factors, it
is helpful to illustrate their link with the pricing kernel. Assume that the
pricing kernel is given by L = b0+b
0f , where f is a vector of factors that
vary over time, and b0 and the vector b are constants. Given E(L) = 1,
this can be rewritten as L = 1 + b0 (f   E(f)). Writing everything in
terms of excess returns, Rek = R
k  Rf , Equation (1.2) becomes
0 = E
 
L  (Rk  Rf ) =: E (L Rek) :
With Re dened as the vector of excess returns of all assets, this is
equivalent to
0 = E (L Re) = E(Re) + b0 cov (f ;Re)
E(Re) =  b0 cov (f ;Re) =  b0 var(f) var(f) 1 cov(f ;Re)
= 0;
where
 =   var(f)b and  = var(f) 1 cov(f ;Re)
are the risk premium and risk exposure of every risk factor. The CAPM
is a special case of that model. If the CAPM pricing kernel L = ~0+~1rm
is plugged in, the expected excess return of an asset in the CAPM is a risk
1.3. ESTIMATION METHODS 1-15
premium, ~ = E(rm),3 times the CAPM-. It measures the exposure to
the market risk and is dened by ~ = cov(rm; R
e)= var(rm).
In general,  are the estimated multiple regression coecients of
excess returns Re on the demeaned factors f . This oers one way to
estimate  and : rst, regress Re on the demeaned factors f to obtain
the estimator ^. Second, regress the average excess returns of the assets
Re on ^ to obtain an estimator for the risk premium ^. Most of the
extant literature stops at this point and estimates the risk premia, k,
of each factor. Because b =   var(f) 1, the estimator for b is
b^ =  
0@ 1
T
TX
t=1
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!01A 1 ^:
The estimated pricing kernel, L^, is obtained by plugging b^ into the de-
nition of the pricing kernel:
L^ = 1 + b^0
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!
:
Appendix 1.8 shows that under weak assumptions (heteroskedasticity
is allowed), b^ is a consistent estimator of b. Through the consistency
of b^ and the law of large numbers, it directly follows that L^ is consis-
tent. While consistency alone does not provide any information about
condence intervals or the signicance of the parameters, these can be
obtained using GMM estimation.
1.3.3 Estimation via the generalized method of mo-
ments
Compared to the factor model, GMM permits more general pricing ker-
nels and provides asymptotic test statistics for the estimated parameters.
Assuming that the pricing kernel is a function of the market excess return
3To obtain that, plug equation (1.7) into the denition of .
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rm, equations (1.2) and (1.3) imply the following moment restrictions:
0 = E
 
L(rm)  (Rk  Rf )

0 = E (L(rm))  1:
The market portfolio also has to be priced correctly. Therefore,
0 = E (L(rm)  rm) =
X
k
E
 
L(rm)  !k(Rk  Rf )

;
where !k is the weight of asset k in the market portfolio in every time
period. Moreover, this condition ensures that the sum of the pricing
error over all assets is close to zero. Given these moment conditions, the
parameter of the pricing kernel can be estimated using GMM. Note that
no assumptions about the distribution of the returns are required, only
that all moments must exist. Additionally, some regularity conditions
should be satised.
Assume that Xt is a vector of the data needed to estimate the model
(mainly asset and market returns in t); then T is the vector of the true
parameter of the pricing kernel, and the vector of all moment conditions
is written as
0 = E(g(Xt;T )) := E
0BBBBB@
L(rm;T )  (R1  Rf )
...
L(rm;T )  (RK  Rf )P
k L(rm;T )  !k(Rk  Rf )
L(rm;T )  1
1CCCCCA :
The estimated parameter ^ is chosen such that the deviations from the
moment conditions are minimized (the deviations are weighted by a
weighting matrix W ):
^(W ) = argmin ngn()
0Wgn()
gn() =
1
n
nX
t=1
g(Xt;):
Under some regularity conditions, the estimator ^(W ) is consistent,
and if W is a consistent estimator of the inverse covariance matrix of
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g(Xt;), the estimator is asymptotically ecient. The dierence be-
tween the estimator ^(W ) and the true parameter T is asymptotically
normally distributed. This approach allows all kinds of statistical tests,
especially t-tests.
The minimization problem of the GMM estimator is solved numeri-
cally. Therefore, accurate starting values are crucial. Because the factor
model presented before provides a consistent estimator of the model pa-
rameters, I use them as starting values.
To obtain an estimation ofW , the two-step GMM method in Hansen
(1982) is applied.4 Using this method, the model is rst estimated with
W as the identity matrix and the parameter estimates from the factor
regression as starting values. Then a heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HAC) covariance matrix for g(Xt;) is calculated (see
Newey and West (1987)). With the inverse of this covariance matrix
serving as the weighting matrix W , the denitive model is estimated.
Hansen et al. (1996) suggested more sophisticated GMM estimators: the
iterated GMM and continuously updated GMM estimator, which dier
in the way they determine W . Newey and Smith (2004) and Anatolyev
(2005) concluded that the two-step and iterated estimators are asymp-
totically equivalent and that the continuously updated estimator has
a smaller asymptotic second-order bias than the other two estimators.
With nite samples, these results can obviously dier. In this paper,
the two-step estimator is used because it turned out to be the numer-
ically most robust estimator. The iterated and continuously updated
estimator leads to extremely volatile pricing kernels. (Chapman (1997)
found similar problems with the iterated GMM estimator, in which the
observed average returns are far from the mean returns predicted by the
model.)
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17 Industry Portfolios
Industry N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
Food 1000 0.0069 0.049 -0.02 9.4 0.8 2.2 0.8 0.09 0.005
Mines 1000 0.0071 0.068 -0.12 5.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.07 0.028
Oil 1000 0.0078 0.061 0.29 7.0 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.01 0.843
Clths 1000 0.0057 0.062 0.33 8.2 0.9 2.5 0.8 0.17 0.000
Durbl 1000 0.0060 0.078 1.36 19.7 1.3 7.3 1.5 0.21 0.000
Chems 1000 0.0074 0.064 0.34 9.5 1.0 4.2 1.1 0.11 0.001
Cnsum 1000 0.0072 0.050 0.25 9.2 0.7 2.8 0.8 0.06 0.070
Cnstr 1000 0.0064 0.069 0.43 8.8 1.2 4.7 1.2 0.11 0.001
Steel 1000 0.0065 0.086 1.37 16.7 1.4 9.1 1.6 0.11 0.000
FabPr 1000 0.0060 0.061 0.15 9.1 1.0 3.6 1.0 0.10 0.001
Machn 1000 0.0078 0.072 0.18 8.6 1.2 4.6 1.2 0.11 0.000
Cars 1000 0.0078 0.079 1.15 16.7 1.2 6.7 1.5 0.15 0.000
Trans 1000 0.0063 0.072 1.01 15.2 1.2 6.1 1.3 0.15 0.000
Utils 1000 0.0056 0.057 0.13 10.5 0.8 2.8 0.9 0.11 0.000
Rtail 1000 0.0068 0.060 -0.01 8.1 0.9 2.7 1.0 0.14 0.000
Finan 1000 0.0071 0.070 0.56 14.3 1.2 5.1 1.3 0.17 0.000
Other 1000 0.0056 0.052 -0.19 6.8 0.9 1.8 0.8 0.12 0.000
Market 1000 0.0091 0.055 0.14 10.5 1.0 3.5 1.0 0.12 0.000
Table 1.1: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e. Rk  
Rf ) of the 17 industry portfolios and the market portfolio: average;
standard deviations; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to
the skewness risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk
(see equation 1.9) and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with
p-value) of portfolio excess returns.
1.4 Data
The suggested estimation methods need the excess returns (i.e., Rk  
Rf ) of various assets and the market, and the market capitalizations of
all the assets as well. Monthly data are used, starting in 1926, from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University
of Chicago. The CRSP all-share index, a value-weighted index of all
common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ markets, is
taken as a proxy for the market portfolio. The risk-free rate is the one-
month T-Bill rate. To avoid spurious results, all kernels are estimated
using the monthly excess returns of ve dierent sets of data. The rst
two sets of assets are the 17 and 30 Fama-French industry portfolios.5
They group all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks into 17 (30) industry
4All estimations are done with R. For the GMM estimations, the GMM-package
of Chausse (2010) has been used.
5Fama and French used data from CRSP to calculate their returns. Compustat
data are used for the portfolio weights of the value portfolios.
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30 Industry Portfolios
Industry N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
Food 1000 0.0068 0.049 0.05 9.4 0.7 2.3 0.8 0.08 0.007
Beer 1000 0.0093 0.075 1.84 25.2 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.09 0.005
Smoke 1000 0.0084 0.059 0.07 6.4 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.07 0.035
Games 1000 0.0076 0.091 0.64 12.3 1.4 6.3 1.6 0.19 0.000
Books 1000 0.0060 0.071 0.52 9.7 1.1 5.0 1.2 0.18 0.000
Hshld 1000 0.0063 0.061 0.37 15.5 0.9 3.7 1.1 0.08 0.008
Clths 1000 0.0055 0.061 0.30 7.9 0.8 1.9 0.6 0.15 0.000
Hlth 1000 0.0077 0.058 0.18 10.1 0.9 3.4 0.9 0.08 0.018
Chems 1000 0.0073 0.064 0.37 9.7 1.0 4.3 1.1 0.10 0.001
Txtls 1000 0.0063 0.081 1.05 12.6 1.2 6.3 1.3 0.18 0.000
Cnstr 1000 0.0061 0.070 0.36 8.9 1.2 4.3 1.1 0.13 0.000
Steel 1000 0.0065 0.085 1.37 16.7 1.4 9.1 1.6 0.11 0.000
FabPr 1000 0.0073 0.073 0.48 10.4 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.13 0.000
ElcEq 1000 0.0088 0.078 0.60 11.6 1.3 6.1 1.4 0.10 0.001
Autos 1000 0.0076 0.081 1.23 17.4 1.2 6.9 1.5 0.15 0.000
Carry 1000 0.0080 0.078 0.49 8.4 1.2 5.0 1.2 0.11 0.001
Mines 1000 0.0067 0.073 0.13 6.7 0.9 3.1 1.0 0.05 0.108
Coal 1000 0.0098 0.092 0.87 9.8 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.217
Oil 1000 0.0077 0.061 0.29 7.0 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.01 0.829
Util 1000 0.0056 0.057 0.13 10.5 0.8 2.8 0.9 0.11 0.000
Telcm 1000 0.0051 0.046 0.00 6.2 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.09 0.007
Servs 1000 0.0089 0.086 1.11 19.2 0.8 -1.6 0.4 0.03 0.361
BusEq 1000 0.0080 0.069 -0.22 6.1 1.1 2.1 0.9 0.09 0.005
Paper 1000 0.0071 0.061 0.36 9.5 1.0 3.9 1.0 0.06 0.071
Trans 1000 0.0059 0.073 1.10 16.0 1.1 6.3 1.3 0.15 0.000
Whlsl 1000 0.0052 0.075 0.65 14.3 1.1 4.2 1.2 0.19 0.000
Rtail 1000 0.0069 0.060 0.02 8.0 0.9 2.8 1.0 0.14 0.000
Meals 1000 0.0073 0.067 -0.34 5.6 1.0 -0.4 0.7 0.15 0.000
Fin 1000 0.0071 0.070 0.56 14.3 1.2 5.1 1.3 0.17 0.000
Other 1000 0.0048 0.069 0.36 9.1 1.1 4.3 1.1 0.14 0.000
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk   Rf )) of the 30 industry portfolios: average; standard deviations;
skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to the skewness risk (see
equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk (see equation 1.9)
and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with p-value) of portfolio
excess returns.
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Panel A: Value Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 1000 0.0054 0.058 -0.02 7.9 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.13 0.000
2 1000 0.0064 0.055 -0.09 8.0 1.0 2.7 0.9 0.09 0.003
3 1000 0.0063 0.054 -0.22 7.8 0.9 2.3 0.9 0.07 0.039
4 1000 0.0062 0.061 1.26 18.8 1.1 6.4 1.3 0.17 0.000
5 1000 0.0069 0.057 0.85 15.3 1.0 5.1 1.1 0.14 0.000
6 1000 0.0073 0.062 0.95 19.2 1.1 5.6 1.3 0.17 0.000
7 1000 0.0074 0.067 1.84 23.4 1.1 8.1 1.4 0.16 0.000
8 1000 0.0090 0.070 2.13 27.2 1.2 8.9 1.5 0.19 0.000
9 1000 0.0098 0.076 1.33 17.3 1.2 7.5 1.5 0.14 0.000
10=high 1000 0.0106 0.094 2.41 27.3 1.5 11.1 1.9 0.16 0.000
Panel B: Size Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=small 1000 0.0115 0.103 3.71 39.6 1.4 11.9 1.8 0.22 0.000
2 1000 0.0096 0.090 2.27 25.0 1.4 8.5 1.6 0.19 0.000
3 1000 0.0095 0.082 1.94 23.3 1.3 8.1 1.5 0.22 0.000
4 1000 0.0090 0.076 1.56 18.8 1.3 7.3 1.4 0.19 0.000
5 1000 0.0086 0.073 1.16 16.1 1.2 6.6 1.4 0.18 0.000
6 1000 0.0085 0.070 1.04 15.1 1.2 6.5 1.4 0.18 0.000
7 1000 0.0081 0.066 0.81 14.0 1.2 5.7 1.3 0.16 0.000
8 1000 0.0074 0.062 0.76 13.8 1.1 5.4 1.2 0.14 0.000
9 1000 0.0069 0.059 0.57 13.4 1.1 4.8 1.2 0.12 0.000
10=big 1000 0.0056 0.051 0.09 9.4 0.9 3.1 0.9 0.09 0.006
Panel C: Momentum Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 995 0.0001 0.099 1.84 19.2 1.6 11.1 1.9 0.16 0.000
2 995 0.0040 0.083 1.84 23.2 1.3 8.9 1.7 0.15 0.000
3 995 0.0041 0.071 1.53 21.8 1.2 7.4 1.5 0.13 0.000
4 995 0.0055 0.065 1.55 20.5 1.1 7.3 1.4 0.13 0.000
5 995 0.0055 0.061 1.31 20.4 1.0 5.7 1.2 0.11 0.000
6 995 0.0062 0.059 0.76 14.8 1.0 4.9 1.2 0.11 0.001
7 995 0.0070 0.056 0.18 10.4 1.0 3.5 1.0 0.07 0.036
8 995 0.0082 0.054 0.04 7.7 0.9 2.6 0.9 0.09 0.006
9 995 0.0089 0.057 -0.30 6.6 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.06 0.061
10=high 995 0.0121 0.066 -0.51 5.2 1.0 0.1 0.7 0.08 0.016
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk   Rf ) of the size, value, and momentum decile portfolios: average;
standard deviations; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to
the skewness risk (see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk
(see equation 1.9), and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with
p-value) of portfolio excess returns.
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sectors, based on the SIC codes of the previous year.6 The advantage
of industry portfolios is that while similar companies are in the same
industry category, the dierences between the dierent industries are
considerable. Industry portfolios, therefore, give a broad overview of the
economy. An alternative way to group rms into dierent portfolios is
to take some criterion and then form decile portfolios. Doing so results
in a large spread of the chosen criterion between the portfolios. Black
et al. (1972) were the rst to use this method by grouping portfolios
based on the past CAPM- = cov(rm; R
e)= var(rm) of the assets. Later,
Fama and French (1992) and many others used value and size portfolios
to study size and value anomalies. However, this method may also yield
spurious results because of data snooping (see Lo and MacKinlay (1990)
and Conrad et al. (2003)). From the Fama-French data library, the value,
size, and momentum decile portfolios are used. The 10-value portfolios
are formed every July by means of sorting the book-to-market ratio of
the previous year. The size decile portfolios for July until the following
June are based on the market capitalization in June of the previous year
from all available assets listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The
momentum decile portfolios are calculated based on the returns between
t  2 and t  12. To retain an asset in a momentum portfolio, the prices
in t  13 and the capitalization of that asset in t  1 must be available.
An extension of Black et al. (1972) is to use higher moment risk factors
instead of the CAPM risk factor, , for forming decile portfolios. The
aim of this procedure is to obtain assets that have risk exposures that
are as dierent from higher order risk as possible. Analogous to Kraus
and Litzenberger (1976) and Post et al. (2008), decile portfolios based
on the skewness risk
i =
E
h 
RM   E(RM )2 (Ri   E(Ri))i
E
h
(RM   E(RM ))3
i (1.8)
6The data and a detailed description of the industry sec-
tors can be found in the Fama-French data library at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
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and additionally to them on the kurtosis risk
i =
E
h 
RM   E(RM )3 (Ri   E(Ri))i
E
h
(RM   E(RM ))4
i (1.9)
are formed, where i and i are generalizations of the CAPM- for the
higher moments risk factors. The  and  portfolios are formed every
July based on the data of the previous 36 months. The deciles are
calculated on the NYSE data. The portfolios contain all the common
stocks from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, where the returns of the
previous 36 months are available.
An overview of the return characteristics can be found in Tables
1.1 to 1.4. The rst column includes the number of observations for
each portfolio. For every portfolio, all available data points are used,
so the number of observations varies slightly. Except for the momentum
portfolios, all Fama-French data range from July 1926 to December 2009.
The momentum portfolios begin in January 1927, as the returns for the
preceding 12 months are needed to calculate momentum. Thereturn data
from  and  portfolios are available from July 1929 to December 2009.
This shorter time horizon stems from the 36-month formation period for
those portfolios.
The average returns for small companies and for stocks with a low
book-to-market ratio and a high past performance are better, as Figure
1.1 depicts. These eects were to be expected and were documented in
such previous studies as Stattman (1980), Banz (1981), Fama and French
(1992, 1993), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). A lower coskewness and
a higher co-kurtosis also result in higher returns. The return variations
between high and low  and  risk are considerably smaller than the
value, size, and momentum eects. This may indicate that  and  are
poor indicators for the future skewness and kurtosis risks of the assets.
For the 30 industry portfolios, the correlation between  and  is
0.797, the correlation between  and  is 0.899, and the correlation be-
tween  and  is 0.941. This means that a large part of the information
on the higher moments is already in the lower moments and may indicate
that incorporating higher order moments may not add much additional
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Panel A: -Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 964 0.0074 0.060 -0.20 6.4 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.06 0.070
2 964 0.0059 0.056 -0.40 8.0 0.9 1.5 0.8 0.12 0.000
3 964 0.0065 0.055 0.25 9.2 0.9 3.2 0.9 0.07 0.034
4 964 0.0072 0.057 0.76 12.1 1.0 4.5 1.1 0.10 0.002
5 964 0.0066 0.057 0.63 11.7 1.0 4.2 1.0 0.12 0.000
6 964 0.0065 0.059 0.14 7.8 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.07 0.034
7 964 0.0064 0.062 0.51 12.7 1.1 4.1 1.2 0.11 0.000
8 964 0.0064 0.069 0.80 14.8 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.14 0.000
9 964 0.0062 0.078 1.54 20.7 1.3 7.9 1.6 0.16 0.000
10=high 964 0.0054 0.087 0.99 15.4 1.5 6.7 1.6 0.14 0.000
Panel B: -Decile Portfolios
Decile N Mean SD Skew. Kurt.    ACF(1) p
1=low 964 0.0053 0.043 -0.37 7.8 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.14 0.000
2 964 0.0049 0.047 -0.22 10.6 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.14 0.000
3 964 0.0063 0.050 0.22 10.0 0.8 2.9 0.9 0.07 0.022
4 964 0.0071 0.057 0.95 14.4 1.0 5.0 1.1 0.09 0.004
5 964 0.0060 0.060 0.23 9.1 1.0 3.2 1.0 0.08 0.015
6 964 0.0067 0.067 0.44 11.1 1.2 4.2 1.2 0.08 0.011
7 964 0.0071 0.071 0.70 12.0 1.2 5.4 1.3 0.07 0.026
8 964 0.0068 0.076 0.56 11.8 1.3 5.2 1.4 0.13 0.000
9 964 0.0062 0.087 0.97 14.4 1.5 7.1 1.6 0.12 0.000
10=high 964 0.0078 0.100 1.00 12.6 1.7 8.3 1.8 0.13 0.000
Table 1.4: Summary statistics of the monthly excess returns (i.e.
Rk   Rf ) of the  and  decile portfolios: Average; standard devia-
tions; skewness; kurtosis; CAPM-; , the exposure to the skewness risk
(see equation 1.8); , the exposure to the kurtosis risk (see equation 1.9)
and the rst-order autocorrelation coecient (with p-value) of portfolio
excess returns.
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Figure 1.1: Average monthly excess returns (i.e. Rk Rf ) of the dierent
decile portfolios
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information. This high correlation is also the reason why no grouping
with -portfolios is included in the analysis: it adds no additional infor-
mation.
The last two columns of the tables provide the rst order autocor-
relation of monthly returns and the p-value for the null hypothesis that
there is no autocorrelation. Signicant autocorrelation can be found in
the returns in a large majority of the assets. Therefore, Newey-West
autocorrelation corrected standard errors will be used for all test statis-
tics in the empirical analysis.
1.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, the empirical results will be discussed. In a rst step,
polynomial kernels up to order three are estimated. Quadratic and cu-
bic kernels turn out to have increasing parts if estimated on industrial
portfolio data. To check for the signicance of the increasing parts of
the kernel, the next step is to remove the increasing parts by means of
a at line. However, this makes the t to the data poorer. A further
possibility to estimate kernels is to increase the order of the polynomial
further. However, except for the return data of the momentum portfo-
lio, there is no evidence for a kernel of higher order. For the momentum
portfolio data, the kernel then turns out to be clearly U-shaped. The
estimation of a piecewise linear kernel and further robustness checks will
conrm the previous results.
1.5.1 Linear, quadratic and cubic pricing kernels
Figure 1.2 provides all of the estimated pricing kernels. The quadratic
and cubic kernels are estimated by GMM. For purposes of an indepen-
dent comparison, the linear benchmark CAPM kernel is also shown. The
cubic and quadratic pricing kernels are similar, indicating that the cu-
bic kernel does not behave in a totally dierent way from the quadratic
kernel. The quadratic pricing kernels are all positive, and the shape is
generally convex (for the cubic kernel evidence is more mixed), which is
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Figure 1.2: Estimated polynomial pricing kernels. The full line is the
quadratic pricing kernel; the dashed line is the cubic pricing kernel, and
the dotted line is the benchmark CAPM kernel. Estimation details for
the quadratic and cubic kernel can be found in subsection 1.3.3 and in
subsection 1.3.1 for the CAPM benchmark.
1.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1-27
in line with the representative expected utility maximizer with decreas-
ing marginal utility. Not in line with that are the increasing parts of
some pricing kernels. The range of the x-axis of these gures is chosen
carefully: the range between -0.105 and 0.1, which covers 95% of the
market returns observed. Outside of this range, the number of obser-
vations is small; therefore, the estimation of the kernel is imprecise. A
broader range on the x-axis would make the U-shapes obviously more
impressive; nonetheless, only a few observations would exist in that ad-
ditional area, and the kernel estimates would not be very reliable. The
increasing regions observed in the industrial portfolios are because of ar-
eas where enough observations for reliable estimation are available. For
the other portfolios, no evidence for increasing parts is available.
Polynomial pricing kernels up to order 3 are estimated in Table 1.5
by GMM. The J-statistic shows that a linear pricing kernel (the CAPM)
is misspecied|that is, the moment conditions are statistically dierent
from zero. Only for the dataset with the value and size portfolios does
a linear pricing kernel appear to be appropriate. For the linear model
with the  and  portfolios, which should especially take into account
the higher-order risk, the J-statistic is only weakly signicant at the 10%
level in the linear specication. This may indicate two things: either 
and  are poor indicators for the higher-order risk of the next year, or
there is not much nonlinearity in the pricing kernel.
The J-statistic for the quadratic kernel of the momentum portfolio
is still signicant at the 1% level. Up to this point, everything else ap-
pears to be reasonably specied with a quadratic kernel. For example, as
Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) also show, the quadratic term is positive
for all portfolios. However, the quadratic parameters are not very signif-
icant. These t-statistics are in line with Pot and Wang (2010), who nd
the polynomial terms of order 2 or more to be insignicant. The Wald
test, which tests the null hypothesis that the model is linear, shows that
for the industry portfolios, a linear kernel can be rejected at the 10%
signicance level. The linear term in the quadratic kernel is negative, as
expected from the CAPM. Moving to a cubic kernel reveals no improve-
ment in terms of the J-statistic, and the sign of the cubic parameter is
ambiguous. The Wald test also does not show large dierences from a
linear model. The likelihood ratio test in Table 1.10 shows that for the
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Panel A: Linear Kernel (CAPM)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 1.01 ** 1.02 ** 1.01 ** 1.01 ** 1.01 **
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
1 -2.17 ** -2.33 ** -2.20 ** -1.61 ** -2.01 **
( 0.62) ( 0.60) ( 0.59) ( 0.57) ( 0.59)
J 33 ** 51 ** 20 67 ** 27
Panel B: Quadratic Kernel
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.93 ** 0.92 ** 1.01 ** 0.98 ** 0.98 **
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.03)
1 -1.94 * -2.65 ** -2.07 ** -2.31 ** -2.78 **
( 0.99) ( 0.96) ( 0.66) ( 0.73) ( 0.86)
2 26.65 y 33.26 * 1.27 9.66 13.87
(15.05) (15.40) ( 5.12) ( 6.91) (10.13)
J 23 40 y 20 55 ** 18
W 3.1 y 4.7 * 0.06 2.0 1.9
Panel C: Cubic Kernel
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.83 ** 0.90 ** 0.98 ** 1.04 ** 1.02 **
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.04) ( 0.05)
1 1.53 -2.05 -1.25 -4.18 ** -4.13 *
( 1.89) ( 1.54) ( 1.68) ( 1.23) ( 1.62)
2 54.99 * 42.53 y 8.48 -8.05 0.02
( 27.85) ( 23.95) ( 18.19) (12.20) (17.06)
3 -143.31 y -36.46 -32.18 82.43 y 66.85
( 79.89) ( 69.43) ( 63.28) (43.18) (59.60)
J 17 40 y 20 64 ** 17
W 3.9 5 y 0.26 4.4 2.7
Table 1.5: GMM Estimation of the polynomial pricing kernels, L =
0 + 1rm + 2r
2
m + 3r
3
m, for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17
and Ind30), for the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS), for the 10-value,
10-size, and 10-momentum portfolios (VSM) and the  and  portfolios.
Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3. The Wald statistic
tests if the quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent from the linear kernel. y,
*, and ** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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17 industry portfolios, the cubic model is almost signicantly dierent
from the quadratic model at the 1% level. Moreover, the parameter for
the cubic term is dierent from zero at the 10% level. For the other
portfolios, there appears to be no reason to move to a cubic kernel.
Up to the momentum portfolio with its highly signicant J-statistic,
all models can be reasonably well estimated by a polynomial up to or-
der 3. Some increasing regions are found in the kernel of the industry
portfolios. The next step is to examine the increasing regions in more
detail.
1.5.2 A closer look at the increasing regions of the
kernel
If the kernel is not just linear, a quadratic pricing kernel has an increasing
region. Therefore, it is rst checked whether or not that region is in an
area that includes some observations of rm. If there are no observations
in that area, the increasing region is irrelevant; and if there are only a
few market returns in the increasing region, then the result is most likely
a statistic artifact. Rmin, the minimum of a quadratic pricing kernel, can
be determined by setting the rst derivative of the kernel to zero:
Rmin =
 1
22
: (1.10)
In the cubic case, the function can have up to one local minimum and
one local maximum, which are given by:
Rextrema =
2 
p
22   313
33
:
Table 1.6 provides the minima of the quadratic kernel and the local
extrema of the cubic kernel. The plausibility of increasing parts of the
kernel is measured by the probability that a market return is in the
increasing area; for the quadratic kernel this is, for example, p(rm 
Rmin). This probability is measured by the number of months the kernel
was in an increasing area divided by the number of all observations.
For the industry portfolios, a monthly return larger than 3.6 and 4%,
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Kernel Variable Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
Quadratic Rmin 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmin) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Cubic Rmin 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmin) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Rmax 0.036 0.040 0.818 0.119 0.100
p(rm  Rmax) 0.279 0.250 0.000 0.016 0.025
Table 1.6: Global minimum (maximum), that is, the turning points of
the quadratic and cubic pricing kernels and fraction of the values of the
market return that are larger than the turning points.
rmin P (rm  rmin) Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0.1 0.0250 0.2859 0.2139 0.0597 0.7984 0.9977
0.2 0.0050 0.1536 0.0870 0.4042 0.5713 0.4783
0.3 0.0030 0.1224 0.0622 0.6470 0.3947 0.3476
0.4 0.0000 0.1090 0.0523 0.7845 0.3212 0.2932
Table 1.7: P-values for a Wald test of the null hypothesis that rmin is
the global minimum of the quadratic pricing kernel. The second column
shows the empirical likelihood that the market return is larger than or
equal to rmin. The test is given for the 17 and 30 industries; the value
and size; the value, size, and momentum; and the  and  portfolios.
respectively, is sucient for belonging to the increasing part of the kernel.
This implies that in more than 25% of all time periods, the realized
pricing kernel was in the increasing region. This observation is supported
by the results from the cubic kernel. Not much evidence of an increasing
kernel can be found in the other portfolios. With, at most, 2.6% of all
months, the quadratic pricing kernel was increasing. For the value/size
portfolios, the cubic kernel implies that there are no local extrema|that
is, the pricing kernel is decreasing everywhere. For the value, size and
momentum, and  and  portfolios, the local maxima are in extremely
negative returns, and the local minima in extremely positive returns.
Therefore, the kernel is falling.
A next step is to check if these increasing parts are statistically sig-
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nicant. One way to do that is to test if the minimum of the quadratic
kernel is within the observed data (or at least in an area where almost
no data are observed). If this can be rejected, the pricing kernel has
increasing parts in the relevant range of market portfolio returns. The
null hypothesis is, therefore, that the minimum of a quadratic pricing
kernel is at rmin. Equation (1.10) implies for the null hypothesis that
1 + 2rmin2 = 0:
The null hypothesis of Rmin = rmin is tested for rmin of 10, 20, 30, and
40%. In the case of rmin = 0:1, only 2.5% of all market excess returns
are larger than rmin, and in the case of rmin = 0:4, no observed market
excess return is larger. If the minimum of the pricing kernel is at one
of these levels, increasing parts of the pricing kernel are in areas with
(almost) no observations. Therefore, they would be irrelevant; that is,
if the null hypothesis of the test cannot be rejected, increasing parts
in the kernel cannot be signicantly statistically supported. Table 1.7
includes the p-values of the Wald test. As shown, in no case is the
estimated minimum of the quadratic pricing kernel dierent from rmin
at the 5% level. A model with an increasing kernel is, therefore, not
signicantly dierent from one without: that is, the increasing parts are
not signicant.
A quadratic kernel always has an increasing part. To ensure that
this part is not just an artifact from the functional form, a new kernel is
used. The basic kernel has a quadratic form, but the slope of the kernel
right to the minima is set to zero: that is, after the minimum, the kernel
becomes a at line, as illustrated with the dashed line in Figure 1.3 for
the estimation for the 30-industry dataset. The estimated parameters of
these kernels are in Panel A of Table 1.8. The parameters themselves are
similar to the quadratic kernels in Table 1.5. However, the value of the J-
statistic in four of the ve portfolios is larger than in the quadratic case.
The J-statistic is the sum of the weighted quadratic moment deviation
divided by the number of time periods|that is, the criterion minimized
by GMM. The smaller values indicate that the increasing parts in the
pricing kernel improve the t of the model.
The earlier approach can be generalized. A maximal level of the
slope of the kernel, m, is xed. If the slope of the estimated quadratic
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kernel would be larger than m, the slope is set to m. With m = 0,
the kernel is as previously, and if m = +1, the kernel is a standard
quadratic kernel. If the kernel were decreasing, as the representative
agent model suggests, one would expect the kernel to continue at one
point in the decreasing part of the U with a linear negative slope: that
is, m  0. m > 0 (given that 2 > 0) indicates the opposite: the
linear part starts after the minima and is increasing. The dotted line in
Figure 1.3 illustrates this. With m = 8:71, the positive slope starts far
outside the plotted range; therefore, the kernel is U-shaped. An estimate
of m can be found in the lower part of Table 1.8. m is positive in four
of the ve portfolios such that the kernel contains an increasing part.
Nonetheless, m is not signicantly dierent from zero; that is, there is
no statistically signicant evidence for increasing parts in the pricing
kernel.
1.5.3 Higher-order pricing kernel
Up to now, only polynomials up to the third order have been taken into
account. Higher-order polynomials may reveal even more information.
In the next step, polynomials up to order 7 are considered. Table 1.9
gives the p-values of the J-statistics that check if the moment conditions
are satised for the dierent polynomials. For quadratic and cubic ker-
nels, the J-statistic is not signicant for most portfolios. Only for the
value, size, and momentum portfolio does a kernel above order 3 help.
In that instance, the J-statistics are highly signicant until order 5 and
not signicant after orders 6 and 7. In the case of the 30 industry, the
J-statistics turn out to be insignicant for a quadratic kernel but signif-
icant for some higher-order polynomials. Intuitively, one would expect
that a higher-order kernel would always t the data better than a lower
order kernel and, therefore, that the J-statistic would fall with the order
of the polynomial since a higher-order kernel is, by denition, always
able to t the data at least as well as a kernel of higher order. However,
the more parameters the model has, the less over-identifying restrictions
exist; therefore, the degrees of freedom of the 2 distribution of the J-
statistic become smaller with the higher polynomial order of the kernel,
and this has a decreasing eect on the p-value. The rst eect is typ-
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Figure 1.3: Estimated pricing kernels for the 30 industry portfolios. The
full line is the quadratic pricing kernel; the dashed line is the quadratic
kernel, which is at after the minimum; and the dotted line is the
quadratic kernel, which continues linear after the slope 8.71. Estima-
tion details can be found in subsection 1.3.3.
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Panel A: Quadratic Kernel Flat after Minimum
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 2.4 0.94 ** 1.01 ** 0.96 ** 0.99 **
( 5.5) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
1 33.6 -0.42 -2.07 ** -1.51 -2.40 **
( 93.1) ( 5.53) ( 0.66) ( 2.30) ( 0.77)
2 194.9 42.24 1.27 19.86 6.89
(337.3) (50.92) ( 5.12) (31.20) (19.38)
J 22 47 * 20 60 ** 23
Panel B: Quadratic Kernel until Slope is m, afterwards Linear
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.84 ** 0.91 ** 1.0 1.04 ** 0.97 **
( 0.13) ( 0.08) ( 2.2) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
1 2.61 -2.61 * -1.5 -4.18 ** -2.91 y
( 8.32) ( 1.17) ( 42.8) ( 1.23) ( 1.51)
2 90.75 38.89 3.6 -8.87 15.52
(68.65) (29.54) (154.2) (12.11) (13.95)
m 3.80 8.71 -1.9 82.16 y 7.55
( 4.37) ( 7.90) ( 1.6) (42.95) (68.62)
J 20 40 y 20 63 ** 18
Table 1.8: Panel A shows the estimation of a quadratic pricing kernel
when the kernel becomes at and when the quadratic function is minimal.
Panel B shows a quadratic kernel in which the slope is restricted to be
smaller or equal to m. If the slope is in a certain range larger than m,
the kernel is made linear with a slope of m in that range. Estimations
were done for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17 and Ind30), for
the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS); for the 10-value, 10-size, and 10-
momentum portfolios (VSM); and for the  and  portfolios. Estimation
details can be found in subsection 1.3.3. The Wald statistic tests if the
quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent from the linear kernel. y, *, and **
indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
1.5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 1-35
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
1 0.010 0.009 0.466 0.000 0.143
2 0.114 0.079 0.389 0.002 0.543
3 0.342 0.065 0.358 0.000 0.490
4 0.264 0.014 0.412 0.000 0.373
5 0.249 0.028 0.364 0.000 0.405
6 0.233 0.018 0.262 0.256 0.299
7 0.469 0.044 0.237 0.275 0.678
Table 1.9: P-values of J-test: The null hypothesis H0 is that the poly-
nomial pricing kernels of orders 1 to 7 are able to explain the moment
conditions.
ically stronger, and, therefore, the p-values are rising most of the time
with the order of the polynomial of the kernel.
If a model with a kernel of a higher order does not perform better than
one with a lower order, there is no reason to choose the model with more
parameters. The likelihood ratio test checks if two nested models are
statistically dierent. If the higher-order model is not dierent, then it is
better to choose the lower-order model. Table 1.10 shows that the linear
kernel can be rejected in almost all cases against the higher-order kernels.
The exception is the value size portfolios. Linear kernels are, therefore,
not sucient. Except for the data with the momentum portfolios, all
other datasets can be modeled with a cubic kernel in the case of the
17-industry dataset and a quadratic kernel for the other portfolios. In
the case of the momentum portfolios, the kernels with orders 6 and 7
are always dierent from the kernels with orders 1 to 3. The kernels of
orders 4, 5, 6, and 7 as estimated with the momentum data are shown
in Figure 1.4. The kernels of orders 4 and 5 have a signicant J-statistic
(i.e., are misspecied) and are not signicantly dierent from the kernels
of orders 2 and 3. Put dierently, they have practically no increasing
parts (for that see gure 1.2(d)). The two kernels with the higher order
are statistically signicantly dierent from the lower-order kernels and
are well specied. The momentum portfolio, therefore, requires a kernel
of at least order 6. The momentum kernel is U-shaped and contains an
increasing part. The lower-order kernels, which are unable to explain
the average returns of the momentum portfolios, did not contain an
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Panel A: H0 is a Linear Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
2 0.001 0.001 1.000 0.001 0.003
3 0.000 0.004 0.859 0.229 0.010
4 0.001 0.123 0.528 0.067 0.037
5 0.002 0.044 0.641 0.193 0.040
6 0.003 0.100 0.870 0.000 0.095
7 0.001 0.026 0.868 0.000 0.016
Panel B: H0 is a Quadratic Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
3 0.012 0.648 0.470 1.000 0.646
4 0.047 1.000 0.295 1.000 1.000
5 0.073 1.000 0.433 1.000 0.804
6 0.098 1.000 0.724 0.000 0.987
7 0.031 0.648 0.743 0.000 0.253
Panel C: H0 is a Cubic Kernel
Order Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
4 1.000 1.000 0.166 0.040 1.000
5 0.733 1.000 0.330 0.208 0.677
6 0.689 1.000 0.673 0.000 0.987
7 0.204 0.537 0.700 0.000 0.173
Table 1.10: P-values of likelihood ratio tests. The linear, quadratic, and
cubic kernels are tested against pricing kernels up to order 7. The null
hypothesis H0 is the linear, quadratic, or cubic pricing kernel.
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(d) Order 7
Figure 1.4: Pricing kernels for the value, size, and momentum portfolios
for polynomial kernels of orders 4 to 7. The dotted line is the benchmark
CAPM. Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3.
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increasing part, showing also that a U-shaped kernel is needed to explain
the risk premium on the momentum portfolios.
In line with Dittmar (2002) and Pot (2006), a kernel up to order 3
is required in most cases, considering the J-statistic and the likelihood
ratio test. The only exception is the dataset with the momentum portfo-
lio. However, the fact that the U-shape of the kernel becomes massively
stronger with the use of a higher order kernel even strengthens the hy-
pothesis of U-shaped kernels.
1.5.4 Piecewise linear kernel
Up to this point, the focus has been on polynomials. A major problem,
especially with the quadratic kernel, is that there are increasing parts of
the kernel almost by construction. To verify that these increasing parts
are not an artifact of the chosen functional form, piecewise linear kernels
are estimated:
L = 0 + 1rm +
8><>:
0 for rm < q1
2(rm   q1) for q1  rm < q2
2(rm   q1) + 3(rm   q2) for q2  rm < q3:
(1.11)
In this setup, there must not be any increasing part in the kernel. In
the following, the market portfolio returns are split into three quantiles
(with 33% of the observations of rM in each), and the kernel is estimated.
The estimations can be found in Table 1.11, and the piecewise linear
kernel is plotted together with the quadratic kernel in Figure 1.5. The
specication tests are quite similar to those for the quadratic and cubic
kernels. The only exception is the kernel estimated from the  and 
portfolios, which start with an increasing part, fall, and then increase
again. This change is strong enough that a Wald test indicates that
the model is statistically dierent from a linear model. In the plots, all
kernels are more or less moving around the quadratic kernel. Four of
the ve portfolios show an increasing kernel in the third quantile. If this
slope is signicantly positive, it can be checked using a Wald test. The p-
values for the 17 and 30 industry, the VSM, and the  and  portfolios are
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Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.69 * 1.00 ** 0.91 ** 1.01 ** 1.60 **
( 0.32) ( 0.27) ( 0.33) ( 0.25) ( 0.26)
1 -9.67 -5.39 -3.75 -3.80 6.39
( 6.37) ( 5.15) ( 5.92) ( 4.59) ( 4.33)
2 12.11 -4.04 5.49 -2.93 -30.30 *
(15.87) (13.32) (16.25) (12.04) ( 12.16)
3 1.28 15.52 -4.53 9.62 26.33 **
(12.05) (11.13) (11.31) ( 8.87) ( 10.05)
J 22 41 y 21 54 ** 14
W 2.9 4.7 y 0.2 3.5 7 *
Table 1.11: Estimation of the piecewise linear pricing kernel (i.e., equa-
tion (1.11)), for the 17 and 30 industry portfolios (Ind17 and Ind30),
the 10-value and 10-size portfolios (VS), the 10-value, 10-size, and 10-
momentum portfolios (VSM), and the  and  portfolios. Estimation de-
tails can be found in subsection 1.3.3. The Wald statistic tests whether
or not the quadratic (cubic) kernel is dierent from the linear kernel. y,
*, and ** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
0.367, 0.142, 0.327, and 0.459. This shows again that the kernel might
be U-shaped, and also that on this occasion, statistical signicance is an
issue.
1.5.5 Robustness checks
All the estimations have been made using ve sets of portfolios, which
can be seen as a rst robustness check. A next obvious robustness check
is to pool all datasets (i.e., 30 industries, value, size, momentum, and 
and -portfolios); the results were comparable to the results of the 30
industries-portfolio. Using more assets also did not improve the signi-
cance of the results. Further, using the identity matrix, the covariance
matrix of the returns or a standard covariance matrix (not taking into
account the serial correlation) as the inverse of the weighting matrix
W does not change the general shape of the pricing kernels. The es-
timations via GMM and OLS are, furthermore, similar. The next step
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Figure 1.5: Piecewise liner pricing kernel (dashed line) compared with
the quadratic pricing kernel (full line) and the benchmark CAPM (dotted
line). Estimation details can be found in subsection 1.3.3.
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Time period Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
 1950 0.232
p(rm  Rmin) 0.014
1951-1970 0.020 0.478 0.028
p(rm  Rmin) 0.417 0.000 0.346
1971-1990 0.113 0.047 0.015 0.053
p(rm  Rmin) 0.025 0.221 0.454 0.154
1991-2009 0.084 0.019 0.012 -0.010
p(rm  Rmin) 0.017 0.435 0.527 0.674
Table 1.12: Global minimum of the quadratic pricing kernel and fraction
of the values of the market return larger than the turning point. If the
estimated quadratic term had a negative sign, the cell has been left
empty.
is to check the time stability and to check if there are any issues with
multicollinearity.
The increasing parts of the pricing kernels are the main points of
interest. A good indicator for these is the global minima of a quadratic
pricing kernel. In Table 1.12, these are calculated for several time win-
dows of approximately 20 years. In cases where the quadratic function
had a maximum instead of a minimum, the cells are left open. For the
period before 1950, including the Great Depression and World War II,
all kernels are almost linear (exact coecients are not tabulated), and
most of the second-order coecients are slightly negative. In the case
of the 30 industry portfolios, the quadratic term is slightly positive with
a value of 3.64. This implies a turning point at 23.2% market returns
per month. The probability that this or an even larger return occurs
is 1.4%, which is extremely small. In the other much less extraordinary
time periods, most pricing kernels are convex and, therefore, have a min-
imum. In over one-half of the sub periods after 1950, the probability of
being in an increasing part of the kernel exceeds 20%. In contrast to
the estimation over the whole time period in Table 1.5, the momentum
portfolio already shows a quadratic kernel with increasing parts. For
the whole period, a kernel of at least order 6 was needed to see this.
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Panel A: Quadratic Kernel (Orthogonalized)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.93 ** 0.92 ** 1.01 ** 0.98 ** 0.98 **
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.03)
1 -1.94 * -2.66 ** -2.07 ** -2.31 ** -2.78 **
( 0.99) ( 0.96) ( 0.66) ( 0.73) ( 0.86)
2 26.71 y 33.33 * 1.32 9.72 13.94
(15.06) (15.40) ( 5.13) ( 6.91) (10.14)
J 23 40 y 20 55 ** 18
W 3.1 y 4.7 * 0.07 2.0 1.9
Panel B: Cubic Kernel (Orthogonalized)
Ind17 Ind30 VS VSM  and 
0 0.83 ** 0.90 ** 0.98 ** 1.03 ** 1.02 **
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.04) ( 0.05)
1 1.40 -2.11 -1.22 -4.14 ** -4.16 *
( 1.89) ( 1.53) ( 1.69) ( 1.24) ( 1.62)
2 55.57 * 41.88 y 8.82 -5.77 -0.49
( 27.97) ( 23.72) ( 18.23) (12.41) (16.97)
3 -150.48 y -39.74 -34.83 81.66 y 68.55
( 84.22) ( 71.80) ( 66.29) (44.86) (61.45)
J 17 40 y 20 65 ** 18
W 4.0 5 y 0.28 4.4 2.7
Table 1.13: Estimation of the orthogonalized pricing kernel, L = 0 +
1rm + 2
 
r2m   arm

+ 3
 
r3m   br2m   crm

, kernels for the 17 and 30
industry portfolios (Ind17 and Ind30); the 10-value and the 10-size port-
folios (VS); the 10-value, 10-size, and-10 momentum portfolios (VSM);
and the  and  portfolios. Estimation details can be found in subsec-
tion 1.3.3. The Wald statistic tests whether or not the quadratic (cubic)
kernel is dierent from the linear kernel. Estimation details can be found
in subsection 1.3.3. y, *, and ** indicate signicance at 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
However, the evidence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel becomes
much smaller for the industry portfolios. Overall, there is evidence for
increasing pricing kernels after 1950.
Another potential issue is multicollinearity, since rm, r
2
m, and r
3
m
are by denition correlated. To address this issue, estimations with
orthogonalized regressors are performed. That is,
L = 0 + 1rm + 2
 
r2m   arm

+ 3
 
r3m   br2m   crm

:
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is the estimated kernel. a, b and c are dened such that
0 = cov(rm; r
2
m   arm) = cov(rm; r3m   br2m   crm)
= cov(r2m; r
3
m   br2m   crm):
The results for the estimation of the pricing kernel with these orthogo-
nalized factors (or polynomials) can be found in Table 1.13. As shown,
these are comparable with the results in Table 1.5{that is, they show
that the pricing kernel for the nonmomentum portfolios must be around
orders 2 or 3. In addition, the signs of the polynomials are identical.
The results are, therefore, robust for multicollinearity.
1.6 Utility function of the representative agent
Assuming there is a representative agent, what would his utility function
look like? In equation (1.4), it was shown that the pricing kernel is
a constant times the marginal utility, i.e. L(rm) =   u0(rm)=u0(c0).
Integrating this implies
u(rm) = constant+

u0(c0)
Z rM
 1
L(r)dr:
This analysis requires that markets be complete and that the representa-
tive agent has correct beliefs and an increasing, concave utility function.
None of these assumptions must be satised. Nevertheless, it is interest-
ing to see the shape of the utility function that would evolve from these
assumptions.
If one normalizes =u0(c0) = 1 and sets the utility function at the left
corner of the graph to zero, the utility function implied for the quadratic,
the piecewise linear, and the benchmark CAPM kernel can be found, as
shown in Figure 1.6. The most obvious point is that all utility functions
are quite similar. This ts the fact that it is dicult to nd statistically
signicant dierences between the dierent kernels. Nonconcavities are
especially observed with the piecewise linear pricing kernel. The prob-
lem is that the shape of the utility function, as implied by the piecewise
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Figure 1.6: Utility function of the representative agent implied by the
pricing kernel in the case of the quadratic pricing kernel (full line), the
piecewise linear pricing kernel (dashed line), and the benchmark CAPM
(dotted line).
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linear kernel, is dierent for every portfolio. The quadratic pricing ker-
nel is typically much closer to the CAPM benchmark. Nonconcavities
are observed in the case of the industry portfolios, but even there they
seem to be weak. Overall, the eect of the nonconcavities in the util-
ity function seems to be weak. Their existence could, nonetheless, alter
completely the investment behavior of the representative agent.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper examined the increasing parts of the U-shaped pricing ker-
nels found in equity data. This has been done in a much broader way
than can be found in the existing literature. In particular, the estimation
on datasets in the industry and momentum portfolios shows clear evi-
dence for increasing parts in the pricing kernel. To make sure that these
increasing parts are not just an artifact of the polynomial functional
form, other functional forms that allow for nonincreasing shapes lead to
a poorer t for the data. Despite the fact that the U-shape of the kernel
can be shown on many dierent datasets, time horizons, and functional
forms in terms of statistical signicance, this evidence is weak. This
paper shows that analogously to factor models, the value, size, and mo-
mentum eect can be explained by the polynomials of market returns of
suciently high order. Another contribution is that the kernels of these
higher-order polynomials are mainly U-shaped, increasing with positive
returns. This is consistent with a positive premium on coskewness.
An implication of the increasing part of the pricing kernel is that the
economy cannot be modeled by a risk-averse, utility-maximizing repre-
sentative agent. This paper shows that this eect is not just a short-run
phenomenon, as with the evidence from stock options data that typically
holds for a specic, typically short, time period. The increasing parts in
the kernel appear to persist over a time horizon of more than 80 years.
So far, there is no generally accepted economic explanation for this phe-
nomenon. For future research, it will be important to check to which
degree heterogeneous, mis-estimated beliefs, Peso problems, incomplete
markets, aggregation problems, and nonstandard preferences contribute
to the empirically observed U-shape. To date, there is clear evidence
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that it is not possible to explain the whole phenomenon with only one
of those factors.
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1.8 Proof of consistency of the pricing ker-
nel estimation via factor model (OLS)
This appendix establishes the consistency of the estimation of the pricing
kernel as estimated by the OLS factor model from section 1.3.2. For
consistency, a more specic setup is required:
Re;kt   E

Re;kt

= (ft   E(ft))0k + kt (1.12)
E

Re;kt

= 0k+ 

k; (1.13)
where Re;kt are the excess returns of asset k in period t, ft is a stochastic
vector of factors in period t, and the vector k is the factor exposures
of asset k. The risk premia associated with the factors is the vector
. The vectors  and k for k = 1; : : : ;K are xed but with unknown
parameters to estimate. kt and 

k are noise terms. The OLS estimator
of k is ^k and is estimated using:
Re;kt  
1
T
TX
t=1
Re;kt =
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
k + 
k
t :
If the expected value is replaced with the sample average,7 the second
equation can be stated as follows:
1
T
TX
t=1
Re;kt = ^
0
k+ k:
7This replacement is unproblematic, as it is possible to include the estimation
error only in the error term|i.e., k = 

k   E

Re;kt

+ 1
T
PT
t=1R
e;k
t .
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Using OLS,  can be estimated from this equation by
^ =
 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
T
TX
t=1
Ret
!
with Ret as the vector of the excess returns of all assets in period t. A
consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of ft is
dVar(ft) = 1
T
TX
t=1
 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
:
From Section 1.3.2, it is known that the parameter of interest is b =
  var(ft) 1. An obvious candidate for an estimator of b is, therefore,
b^ =  dVar(ft) 1^:
The next step is to show that b^ is a consistent estimator. For this, the
following assumptions are required:
 ft is stochastic and

ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft

kt is a martingale dierence
sequence for all assets k

1
T
PT
t=1 ft
p! E (ft), where jE (ft)j <1
 E
 
kt
2 
ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft

ft   1T
PT
t=1 ft
0
= t, a positive
denite matrix, with 1T
PT
t=1t converging to a positive denite
matrix  and
1
T
TX
t=1
 
kt
2 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
! 
ft   1
T
TX
t=1
ft
!0
p! 

dVar(ft) p! Q = var(ft), where Q is nonsingular

1
K
PT
t=1 k
0
k is a nite nonsingular matrix
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 k and l, l 6= k are independent random variables with E(k) = 0
and var(k) = 
2
i <1.
 k is furthermore independent of all ft and 
k
t
The assumptions about ft and 
k
t are standard assumptions to en-
sure consistency for the parameters of a regression model with general
heteroskedasticity in the error terms; this model dates back to Eicker
(1967), White (1980), Hansen (1982) and Nicholls and Pagan (1983).
Therefore, the OLS estimator ^k for equation (1.12) converges to k,
that is,
^k
p! k:
If 1=T
PT
t=1R
e;k
t = 
0
k+ k is plugged into ^, the estimator b is
b^ =  dVar(ft) 1^ =  dVar(ft) 1 1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k
0
k+ k
!
=  dVar(ft) 1 1
K
KX
k=1
^k^
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
^k
0
k+
1
K
KX
k=1
^kk
!
:
A rst step to prove the consistency of b^ is to show that
1
K
KX
k=1
^kk
p! 0: (1.14)
^k is a function of ft and 
k
t . k is independent of these two variables.
Therefore, k and ^k are also independent and ^kk is a martingale
dierence sequence. The assumptions further imply bounded covari-
ance matrices for k and ft. Therefore, cov(^k; k) is bounded. Then,
by example 7.11 in Hamilton (1994), equation (1.14) holds. Further,dVar(ft) p! var(ft) and ^k p! k. From the fact that there are only
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continuous functions in the estimator, it follows that
b^
p!   var(ft) 1
 
1
K
KX
k=1
k
0
k
! 1 
1
K
KX
k=1
k
0
k+ 0
!
b^
p!   var(ft) 1 = b:
In other words, b^ is a consistent estimator for b. However, the number
of assets and the number of time steps have to converge to innity for
this estimator to be consistent.
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Article 2
Firm Life Cycles under
Financial Constraints
and Additive Shocks
Joint work with Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe
Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of the rm life cycle that captures
several stylized economic and nancial features which usually require considerably
more demanding approaches. We study the optimal capital accumulation policy of a
nancially constrained rm whose revenue is subject to an additive shock. Earnings
can be paid as dividends or reinvested with the goal to maximize shareholder value.
In our model, the optimal policy of rms is to reinvest earnings (rather than paying
dividends) when small, hold precautionary savings, and grow larger than is socially
optimal. Smaller rms also have a higher bankruptcy risk and a more volatile market
value than larger rms. We observe the leverage eect and excess returns of value
stocks. In the presence of business cycles, investment and initial public oerings are
pro-cyclical, the default probability is counter-cyclical, and monetary policy increases
excess capital holdings but otherwise has a negligible impact.
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2.1 Introduction
The theory of the rm life cycle, starting with the seminal contribution
by Mueller (1972), continues to attract the interest of economists and
nance researchers. At the heart of economic contributions to this theory
is that a rm's investment opportunities and, therefore, its investment
policy changes over time: young rms are innovative with high growth
potential but lack capital; mature companies have few options for growth,
face diseconomies of scale but are well capitalized.1 From a nancial
perspective, the rm life cycle can be summarized as follows. Small
rms are young, pay low (if any) dividends, grow quickly and have a high
risk of bankruptcy while large companies are older, pay high dividends,
barely grow and have a lower risk of default. Empirical support for the
characterization of the life cycle through rms' dividend payments is
given, e.g., by Fazzari et al. (1988), Fama and French (2001), Grullon
et al. (2002) and DeAngelo et al. (2006). The growth/default perspective
is supported by the ndings of Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b), Dunne et al.
(1989) and Dhawan (2001).
Implications of nancing constraints on the relation between the rm
size and growth rates, default probabilities, and Tobin's q are discussed
in Cooley and Quadrini (2001) who nd that all of these measures are
decreasing in the size of the rm. Other nancial characteristics related
to the size of the rm (and thus to the life cycle) are empirical obser-
vations on pro-cyclical investment behavior (Barro (1990)) and defaults
(Chava and Jarrow (2004), Vassalou and Xing (2004)) and Chen (2010)).
This paper illustrates that these stylized empirical facts can be ob-
tained in a very simple, neoclassical model where growth is purely driven
by capital accumulation. To this end, we study the optimal dividend-
investment policy of a rm whose earnings are subject to uctuations
in the output market (which acts as an additive shock to production).
The rm does not have access to outside nance and growth has to be
`organic,' only accumulated capital can serve as a cushion against ex-
1Growth of a rm can take many dierent forms, for instance, development of
new products or improvement in production eciency through R&D, entering new
markets, mergers and acquisitions to foster vertical or horizontal integration and
many others.
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ogenous shocks. Most eects are present under i.i.d. shocks, but we also
consider the impact of the business cycle (in particular its depth and du-
ration as well as central bank's interest rate policies) on the nancially
constrained rm's optimal behavior.
The role of nancing constraints in the behavior of the rm and its
implications for the dividend policy has been studied, e.g., by Cooley and
Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), and Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006) whose results imply that credit restrictions can give
rise to the rm life cycle.2 Financing constraints force companies to save
in order to ensure access to funding if and when needed. When companies
do access their savings, however, is not obvious. Almeida et al. (2004)
conclude that rms mostly save in times of high cash ows which enables
them to realize investment opportunities in leaner times. Riddick and
Whited (2009), in contrast, nd that it is prot-maximizing to reduce
savings in good times because these oer more protable investment
opportunities. In our model, the rm does not have access to any outside
nancing other than the initial investment by the owner; all growth has to
be organic. Furthermore, nancial market features as the value premium
and the leverage eect can be explained by our model. This is in line
with simulation results from Livdan et al. (2009).
Economics has produced a wealth of models explaining the rm life
cycle of which only a few classical contributions are cited here. Mueller
and Tilton (1969) discuss a technological-development cycle where many
rms enter a new market and heavily invest in R&D which makes it more
dicult for other newcomers to enter. Eventually technological progress
slows and production techniques become standardized|the industry has
matured and late entrants face large capital requirements. Therefore
companies are growing fast (and face high risks of default) when they
are young but their growth rate decreases over time. A similar dynamics
occurs over the life cycle of a product, see, e.g., Gort and Klepper (1982)
and Klepper (1996). A new product market draws in many entrants,
reducing protability and forcing exits by all but those who have the
2Financial constraints arise for a number of reasons, for instance, information
asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Greenwald et al. (1984), and Myers and
Majluf (1984)) or agency conicts (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart
(1982) and Jensen (1986)).
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lowest R&D costs per produced unit|typically large companies. Other
approaches stress the role of learning in rms' eort to determine their
actual cost functions as, e.g., in the seminal contribution by Jovanovic
(1982). In our model, there is only one rm with a xed (and known)
neoclassical production function whose earnings are subject to an addi-
tive shock and nancial constraints.
In departure to the majority of literature as for example Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) this paper uses additive shocks to the production func-
tion. This results in a non-concave value function and that companies
may endogenously decide on the exit from the market (since a negative
shock could wipe out the whole company, it can make sense to sell almost
all assets, if a number of negative shocks are expected in future). Further-
more, additive shocks together with the nancing constraint bring with
them a surprising wealth of stylized facts in our simple model as shown
in the literature discussion in the previous paragraphs.3 An improve-
ment to the existing literature is in that respect that the rm life-cycle
and nancial market eects as the value and the leverage eect can be
explained in one model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2
introduces the model. Section 2.3 numerically analyzes the rm's optimal
dividend-investment policy for i.i.d. shocks and the resulting dynamic.
Section 2.4 studies the impact of the business cycle on rms' behavior.
Section 2.5 briey looks into the eects of a central bank's interest rate
policy. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider the optimal dividend-investment policy of a rm whose pro-
duction is subject to exogenous shocks which entails random variations
in earnings. The rm has no access to outside capital and growth has
3Our model is much simpler than the one of Cooley and Quadrini (2001), because
no outside nancing is allowed. This reduces the number of variables in the optimiza-
tion problem as well as the total number of parameters in the model drastically. Due
to the additive shocks on the other hand, the model gains more complexity.
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to be organic. The rm can either retain prots to augment its capi-
tal stock, pay dividends to its owners, or combine both measures. The
dividend payment stream is chosen such that its expected net present
value is maximized. We consider the optimal dividend-investment policy
of a rm whose production is subject to exogenous shocks which entails
random variations in earnings. The rm has no access to outside cap-
ital and growth has to be organic. The rm can either retain prots
to augment its capital stock, pay dividends to its owners, or combine
both measures. The dividend payment stream is chosen such that its
expected net present value is maximized. We assume that there are no
agency conicts between owner and management.
The rm's decision problem. Time is discrete with an innite
horizon, t = 0; 1; :::. The shock s 2 S := fS1; :::; Sng, Si 2 R for
i = 1; :::; n, follows a stationary time-homogeneous Markov process with
transition probabilities s~s, s; ~s 2 S. Given a state s, Es() denotes the
conditional expectation. We will study the rm's dividend policy rst
for an i.i.d. process (where s~s does not depend on s), and then for a
proper Markov process (as a model of the business cycle).
The net production function f(k; s) is assumed to be non-negative,
continuous and bounded. We will further assume that the output f(k; s)
is increasing in the capital input investment) k and decreasing in the
shock s. Our analysis will focus on production functions of the form
f(k; s) = maxfg(k)  s; 0g; (2.1)
with a strictly concave function g(k). If the output is zero (which hap-
pens when a shock of suciently large magnitude occurs), the rm is
declared bankrupt because its output will remain zero in all future peri-
ods owing to a lack of access to outside nance.
The state of the shock is revealed after the capital is invested. Future
payments are discounted with the discount factor  2 (0; 1). The rm
solves the following optimization problem for a given pair (y0; s0) 2
R+  S of initial capital and initial state of the shock:
V (y0; s0) := sup
(dt)t0
Es0
1X
t=0
tdt (2.2)
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subject to
yt+1 = f(kt; st+1) and 0  dt  yt with kt := yt   dt: (2.3)
Wasting capital is not optimal because the objective function is strictly
increasing in each dt. Therefore, the budget constraint in (2.3) is written
as an equality. The above specication allows rms to pay out all initial
capital as dividends in the rst period without ever producing. The
Bellman equation for the value of the optimization problem (2.2) is given
by
V (y; s) = sup
0dy
 
d+ 
X
~s2S
s~sV (f(y   d; ~s); ~s)
!
: (2.4)
Standard results (Stokey et al. (1989, Chapter 9)) ensure that there
exists a unique solution V (y; s) and a process (dt)t0 attaining the supre-
mum in the optimization problem (2.2){(2.3). Indeed, the supremum can
be replaced by a maximum in (2.4). However, as the production func-
tion k 7! f(k; s) is not necessarily concave, uniqueness of the optimal
path cannot be guaranteed. We will choose the highest current dividend
payment at which the maximum of the value function is attained. This
selection rule leads to a unique dividend-investment policy.
Numerical approximation method. The numerical approxima-
tion of the value function uses the fact that the sequence
Vn+1(y; s) := max
0dy
(d+ EsVn(f(y   d; ~s); ~s)) (2.5)
converges to the solution to (2.4), thanks to Blackwell's sucient condi-
tions for a contraction, see, e.g., Stokey et al. (1989, Theorem 9.6). The
rm's optimal policy is determined numerically by solving the right-hand
side of (2.5) for a given approximation of the value function. It suces
to approximate the value V (y; s) on a set [0; y]  S with y suciently
large because the net production function f and the set of shocks are
bounded.
A rm without nancing constraint. A useful benchmark is ob-
tained by removing the restriction on access to outside nancing. Sup-
pose the rm can borrow and lend at an interest rate r > 0. The discount
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rate is  = 1=(1+r). The optimization problem of the rm is unchanged
but the budget constraint (2.3) is
yt+1 = f(yt dt+bt (1+r)bt 1; st+1); and 0  dt  yt+bt (1+r)bt 1
with b 1 = 0. The principal amount bt 1 borrowed at time t 1 and the
interest rbt 1 need to be repaid at time t. As debt can be rolled over,
one has to assume that supt Ebt <1 to exclude Ponzi schemes.
The optimal investment k(s), which depends only on the current
state s, is determined by Es[f 0(k(s); ~s)] = 1 + r. Suppose that the
production function is given by (2.1). Then, investing the capital k, the
probability that there is no output in the current period is given by:
zs(k) =
X
f~s2S: g(k)~sg
s~s:
The optimal investment k(s) is given by the solution to:
k = (g0) 1

1 + r
1  zs(k)

: (2.6)
If a solution k(s) exists, the rm will operate forever and default will not
happen because of access to outside nancing in each period. Otherwise,
the rm will not be established since its net present value would be
negative. The additive shock is an extreme assumption, since the rm
is hidden by the shock independent, if it is doing something or not.
Especially the rm cannot decide to do nothing to be not exposed to the
shock. The advantage of this assumption is that small rms are exposed
to a relatively larger risk within a very simple structure.
Parameter values and production function. We consider a
Cobb{Douglas type production function with negative shocks:
f(k; s) = maxfk   k   s; 0g; (2.7)
where  > 0, 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1. The values are set to
 = 0:8;  = 0:95;  = 2:0; and  = 0:1; (2.8)
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ensuring that small companies do not grow too fast ( is close to one
to reduce marginal productivity for small capital stocks) and that rms
with little capital are worth founding ( is suciently large to avoid the
optimality of paying all capital as dividends, without ever producing).
Our focus is on the stylized features of the dynamics; no attempt is made
to calibrate this simple model.
2.3 Optimal policy of the rm under i.i.d.
shocks
The optimal dividend-investment policy of the rm is rst studied for
i.i.d. shocks. The production shock st 2 fS1; S2g with S1 = 0 and S2 = 2
is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and assigns the same
probability to each state, 1 = 2 = 0:5 (all transition probabilities s~s =
0:5). The current state of the shock has no impact on the distribution
of the next state and the value function is independent of s. The model
parameters are dened in (2.7){(2.8). In state S1, production is standard
Cobb{Douglas, with sustainable positive levels of capital stock. The
state S2, however, has a severe impact on the rm's capital and will
deplete, after a long enough run, any amount of capital.
The value function is approximated numerically on a grid of 20,000
equidistant points in the interval [0; y], y = 20:0. This set is forward
invariant under the dynamics because maxs2S f(y; s) = f(y; 0) < y, i.e.,
no rm will accumulate more capital than y. The numerical iteration
(2.5) is performed until two subsequent functions are closer than 10 4 in
the supremum norm kV k = sup0yy jV (y)j. From this approximation
of the value function, we extract the optimal policy using the right-hand
side of (2.5) subject to choosing the highest current dividend payment
if the optimal decision is not unique. No numerical instabilities were
encountered.
2.3. OPTIMAL POLICY OF THE FIRM UNDER I.I.D. SHOCKS 2-9
2.3.1 Dynamics
The rm's optimal investment, optimal dividend payment and the value
function for given capital stocks are depicted in Figures 2.1(a)-2.1(c).
The properties of each of these functions and their economic and nancial
implications are discussed in turn and compared with stylized empirical
ndings.
Value function. The value function, Figure 2.1(a), is not concave
and exhibits kinks. This is a consequence of the non-smoothness of the
production function for the shock s = S2 because the risk of bankruptcy
(i.e., the loss of the entire capital) does not depend continuously on the
capital stock but rather jumps at levels of the capital stock which are
exactly depleted when a run of n negative shocks prevails. Increasing
capital at any of these critical levels by an arbitrarily small amount, dras-
tically reduces the (n-run) bankruptcy risk. Although non-smoothness
of the value function seems to have no eect on the optimal dividend
policy, Section 2.3.3 shows that this is not true in general.
Dividend and investment policy. The optimal investment and
dividend policy are depicted in Figures 2.1(b) and (c). The rm's policy
is simple: below a certain capital level, all earnings are reinvested and
no dividends are paid. If the output exceeds this threshold, then the
capital stock is held constant and all `excess earnings' are disbursed to
the owners.
The threshold capital stock above which dividend payments are made
is given by k = 5:48. This level is about 6.4% higher than the opti-
mal (constant) investments of 5.15 which would be employed by a rm
without nancing constraints in every period. The higher capital stock
reduces bankruptcy risk and allows the rm to rebuild its capital faster
and resume dividend payments earlier, after the occurrence of the shock
S2. The rm's policy can be interpreted as precautionary savings which
enable the rm to (temporarily) mitigate the eect of the shock. Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) nd the same investment policy in a model with
default costs, costs of raising new capital and shocks that are propor-
tional to the rm's output. In a continuous time setup with nancial
constraints and irreversible investment Holt (2003) nds a similar in-
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(c) Optimal dividend payment.
Figure 2.1: Value function V (yt), optimal investment kt and optimal
dividend payment dt as a function of the initial capital stock yt. Cobb{
Douglas production function (2.7) with parameters (2.8) and uniformly
distributed i.i.d. shock with values S1 = 0 and S2 = 2.
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vestment policy: rms try to reach a certain optimal capital level, if the
company is above that level it stops investing (in their setup the capital
is irreversible, i.e. it cannot shrink).
In our model rms invest more than socially optimal and their op-
timal size is larger than if they had access to outside nance. Unlike
in models with perfect capital markets such as Modigliani and Miller
(1958) (where dividend payments can be oset by renancing), the divi-
dend policy matters and precautionary savings are optimal. The optimal
policy of the rm matches empirical observations on retained earnings.
Fazzari et al. (1988) nd that rms with a value below 10 million dollars
(small rms) have a retention ratio of 79%, whereas rms with a value
over one billion have a ratio of 52%, i.e., smaller rms rely more on in-
ternal funding of investments. Guiso (1998), however, nds that size can
be a poor proxy for measuring credit constraints.
Precautionary savings are, in practice, often related to holding more
liquid assets, Opler et al. (1999). Our model makes no distinction be-
tween liquid and illiquid assets but the rm holds more assets than if
it were unconstrained. Further evidence of precautionary savings is pre-
sented in Almeida et al. (2004) who nd that companies save a larger
proportion of their cash ow in good times (when the cash ow is high)
in order to realize investment opportunities in times with low cash ows.
This behavior closely resembles the precautionary savings observed in
our model where the rm requires capital to survive negative shocks.
The rm's optimal dividend policy implies that larger companies pay
more dividends and very small companies do not pay any. Fazzari et al.
(1988) nd that, in 1970, low dividend-paying rms were, on average,
more than 12 times smaller than the high dividend-paying rms and
that rms with low dividends, investments relative to capital are almost
50% higher than for high dividend payers. More recent ndings by Fama
and French (2001), and Grullon et al. (2002) are similar. According to
DeAngelo et al. (2006), in 2003, only 18.9% of the companies paid any
dividends.
Growth rates and default. The risk of default cannot be elim-
inated by the rm this parametrization, though the more capital that
a company has, the longer it can survive. Therefore, the likelihood of
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default decreases with rm size, see Table 2.1. If a rm's capital is below
1:0671, it will default if the shock S2 = 2 occurs. This default occurs
independently of the investment decision because the shock will destroy
the rm's entire capital within one period. A larger rm will survive
longer.
The rm invests all of its capital if y0  k = 5:48. For y0 > k,
the rm pays its owners the amount y0   k and invests k. As long as
yt < k
, the rm aims to accumulate more capital. The rm grows if and
only if the shock is S1 = 0. When the shock S2 occurs, the rm shrinks
and continues with a lower capital stock in the subsequent period. A rm
with capital stock of k can survive a run of 12 shocks of size S2, but it
would default after the thirteenth shock. (The probability of this event
is 0:513  0:0122%.) At the socially optimal capital stock (k = 5:15),
the rm would default earlier.
Current capital y
0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Prob. of default after 1 period 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Prob. of default within 5 periods 0.75 0.59 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.00
Marginal productivity (g0(y)) 1.74 1.5 1.29 1.18 1.11 1.06
Exp. growth rate of capital (in %) 9.87 -5.00 14.11 17.21 16.57 14.69
Table 2.1: Probability of default over one and ve periods, marginal
productivity, and expected growth rate of the rm's capital for dierent
current capital stocks y.
The relation between dividend payments and rms' growth rate is
quite intricate in our simple model. Small (non-dividend paying) rms
have a high marginal productivity but also a high risk of default, leading
to a low expected growth rate (in the short run). Large rms have
low marginal productivity and therefore grow slowly, if at all. Table 2.1
provides data on the expected value of (k1 y0)=y0, the expected growth
rate of the rm size over T = 1 period. (In our model, positive growth
only happens in the absence of the negative shock S2.) Small as well
as large companies experience falling growth rates with increasing size.
The growth rate of smaller rms is more volatile because the the shock
is independent of rm size; small rms are riskier than large rms.
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Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b) and Dhawan (2001) provide evidence,
based on US manufacturing rm data, that small rms grow quicker, are
more productive and riskier than larger rms. Models with nancing
constraints typically arrive at the same result, see, for example, Cooley
and Quadrini (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006). Beside that young and small rms grow quicker
as Huynh and Petrunia (2010) showed, if the debt to asset ratio is low.
I.e. deep pockets remove nancial constraints and allow a faster growth.
This is in line with our model, reducing nancial constraints by pro-
viding more capital, increases the value of constraint rms massively.
This can be seen especially by the steepness of the value function in g-
ure 2.1(a) for small strongly constrained rms. The most extreme case
is the unconstrained rm, which immediately jump to a much higher
capital level.
Quantifying the eect of the nancing constraint. The eco-
nomic impact of the nancing constraint on the rm's capital stock,
compared with the social optimum, is twofold. Young companies are
forced to grow organically and are forced to invest less than is socially
optimal, whereas large companies hold too much capital as an insurance
against bankruptcy risk. The loss to the shareholders incurred by the
lack of outside nance is quantied in Table 2.2.
Current capital y
0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
NPV Organic growth (1) 0.0 1.9 3.5 7.9 11.1 12.9 14.1
Outside nance (2) 9.2 9.7 10.2 11.2 12.2 13.2 14.2
(1) as % of (2) 0.0 19.6 34.3 70.5 91.0 97.3 99.3
Table 2.2: Net present value (NPV) of the rm as a function of the
current capital stock: with and without nancing constraint.
With access to outside nance, ownership of technology has value
even if the rm does not hold capital; its net present value is 9:2. In-
creasing the initial capital, increases the value of the rm by the same
amount. Without capital and outside nancing, the rm has no value.
As the initial capital paid by the shareholders increases, so does the
value of the rm that needs to grow organically | but the eect is not
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linear. Small amounts of capital can have a large impact which is equal
to the marginal productivity corrected for the risk of bankruptcy. The
dierence between the value of the rm in these two scenarios decreases
with increasing equity. The nancing constraint carries a substantial
economic cost for smaller rms. This nding shows a large impact of
nancial constraints to the value and therewith also with the production
of the rm. This is in line with the equilibrium model of Clemens and
Heinemann (2010), who showed in a setup with labor market and inter-
mediate goods calibrated to US data that tighter nancial constraints
lead to substantial losses in aggregate output and welfare.
2.3.2 Risk/return characteristics
The characteristic of risk and return prole of an investment into the
rm matters, for instance, to the founder of a rm as well as to the
investors when the rm goes public. We study an owner-entrepreneur
who invests the initial capital y0 and will be able to sell the rm for its
net present value V (yT ; sT ) in an IPO after T periods. (Here we assume
that the investors are risk-neutral and the market is ecient.) The rm
follows the optimal dividend policy described above.
Internal investment. The attractiveness of the initial investment
into the rm can be measured by an average Tobin's q: The market value
divided by the replacement value of the investment (Tobin (1969)). In
our model, Tobin's q is given by V (y)=y, the net present value divided
by the available capital y. This quantity describes the gross return to
the rm's founder who invests y and immediately sells the rm for its net
present value V (y). Figure 2.2 depicts the relationship between Tobin's
q and the initial capital y.
Tobin's q is high for small rms and decreases with rm size for
larger capital stocks, though it is always larger than 1. Firms with a
high Tobin's q reinvest all earnings, whereas those with a low Tobin's
q pay dividends. The scope for expected future income, which can be
realized with retained earnings, gives small rms a high value relative to
its capital. Relative to the socially optimal size they are too small and
the nancing constraint bits particularly hard. These observations are
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Figure 2.2: Tobin's q, V (y)=y, as a function of the initial capital y (i.e.,
the replacement value of the capital before dividend payment).
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in lines with ndings by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Erickson and Whited
(2000) who show that constrained US rms have a higher Tobin's q and
that these rms invest more. These properties also correspond to the
simulation results presented in Cooley and Quadrini (2001).
For intermediate rm sizes, the non-concavity of the value function
(owing to bankruptcy risk) implies a rather complex relationship which
implies that, even in simple models, the relation between size and Tobin's
q is not trivial. This puts into perspective the diculties in nding strong
empirical relations between Tobin's q and investment.
Outside investment. The gross return to a stock market investor
who participates in the IPO is measured by the annualized ratio of the
rm's net present value at time T and the ex-dividend net present value
at time 0:
RT (y0; s
T ) =

V (yT (s
T ))
V (y0)  d0
1=T
; (2.9)
where yT (s
T ) is the output in period T , which is determined by the
sequence of shocks sT = (s1; : : : ; sT ) and the rm's optimal dividend
policy. The mean and variance of the return are given by
T (y0) =
X
sT2ST
p(sT )RT (y0; s
T )
and
T (y0)
2 =
X
sT2ST
p(sT )(RT (y0; s
T )  T (y0))2;
where p(sT ) = s1   sT is the probability of observing the sequence of
shocks sT .
Empirical evidence of Whited and Wu (2006) and the simulation
results of Livdan et al. (2009) suggest that, on average, more constrained
rms have higher returns and higher volatility. In our model this holds
only for very small rms. For example, if T = 5, the initial capital
must be below y0 = 0:902 which gives very unattractive expected return
below T = 0:44317. Indeed, the return-volatility prole improves for
investments up to y0 = 3:617 where T = 1:02608 and T = 0:05425.
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Figure 2.3: Expected gross return T (y0) over T = 5 periods as a func-
tion of the rm's, market value V (y0) (panel (a)) and its market-to-book
ratio V (y0)=y0 (panel (b)). Each point on the graphs corresponds to a
particular initial capital stock y0 with y0 = n  10 3, n an integer and
0:1  y0  k = 5:48.
For higher initial investments, the relation between the expected return
and volatility follows the classical mean-variance diagram.
Leverage eect. As the company does not issue new capital, the
market value of the rm is equal to its equity price and, therefore, some
observations on equity returns can be made. Figure 2.3(a) presents
the volatility of stock market returns, dened in (2.9), as a function
of the value of the rm (i.e., its market capitalization). For large rms,
volatility decreases with market capitalization. This eect is reversed for
smaller rms with a value below 3:2240. Higher volatility as a result of
falling equity prices, as observed for the large companies in Figure 2.3(a),
is a stylized fact called the leverage eect. Black (1976) argues that a
drop in the value of a company increases its leverage and, therefore,
makes it riskier. Christie (1982) and Schwert (1989) show that volatility
is an increasing function of leverage. The simulation results by Livdan
et al. (2009) also show that nancially constrained rms have a higher
systematic risk.
2-18 ARTICLE 2. FIRM LIFE CYCLES
Another possible explanation of the leverage eect is that a per-
manent increase in volatility increases, leads shareholders to demand a
higher average return; therefore, today's price has to fall. This point is
made, e.g., by Pindyck (1984), French et al. (1987), Turner et al. (1989),
Campbell and Hentschel (1992), Wu (2001), Kim et al. (2004) and May-
eld (2004). Bekaert and Wu (2000) and Bae et al. (2007) quantify both
eects in a model and nd that the second eect is stronger. Since in
the present model there is neither a risk premium nor leverage, our re-
sults show that these eects can be caused by nancial constraints: A
less valuable company becomes riskier because the likelihood of default
increases if there is less capital to absorb shocks.
Value premium. The book value of a rm is the replacement value
of the assets that the company owns. The market-to-book value ratio is
an indicator of whether the company is a so-called `growth' company or
a `value' company. A growth company (high market-to-book value) has
few assets now, but the market expects the company to grow quickly and
deliver substantial prot in the future. Value companies (low market-
to-book value) already have many assets today, and their growth ex-
pectations are lower. Figure 2.3(b) illustrates the relation between the
market-to-book ratio and expected returns in our model.
Firms with a low market-to-book value have a high capital stock but
they also have high expected returns. The maximum expected return of
1:02608 is attained at a market-to-book ratio of 3:40557. Companies with
little initial capital have a high market-to-book value but low returns
and, by and large, the returns increase with a higher market-to-book
ratio (see Figure 2.3(b)). This property is in line with the empirical
ndings by Stattman (1980), Rosenberg et al. (1985) and Chan et al.
(1991). Fama and French (1992, 1998) and others found (using US and
international data) that value stocks perform better than growth stocks,
and that this eect cannot be explained by market risk factors. It is
often argued that the premium for value stocks (i.e., stocks with a low
book-to-market value) reects other risk factors. In that view, the value
premium is an indicator of the investment opportunities in the economy.4
4E.g., Fama and French (1996), Liew and Vassalou (2000), Campbell and
Vuolteenaho (2004), Brennan et al. (2004), Hahn and Lee (2006) and Petkova (2006)
or, for equilibrium models, Gomes et al. (2003), Zhang (2005) and Lettau andWachter
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Our model shows (as also observed by Livdan et al. (2009)) that these
considerations are not needed if there are nancial constraints. High
market-to-book ratios may just be an indicator for nancially constrained
rms that also face a higher default risk, such that expected returns are
lower.
2.3.3 Multiple i.i.d. shocks
This section briey studies an extended version of the previous model
where the i.i.d. shocks can take on more than two values. It turns out
that the non-concavity of the value function can indeed entail a more
complex dynamics. For instance, the maximum size of the rm becomes
a function of the initial investment. We assume that one additional
(large) shock S3 = 6 occurs with probability 3 = 0:09 while the two
other shocks S1 = 0 and S2 = 2 are assigned equal probabilities 1 =
2 = (1  3)=2. Figure 2.4 shows the optimal investment and dividend
as a function of the rm's capital.5
The optimal dividend-investment policy diers markedly from the
one obtained in the previous case, displaying several `plateaus' in Fig-
ure 2.4(a). In the present example there are three distinctive plateaus at
dierent levels of capital stocks: low (kl = 0:128), medium (k

m = 3:766)
and high (kh = 5:283). Each of these plateaus corresponds to a capital
level above which the rm starts paying dividends. A rm with a capital
stock below kl pays out all earnings exceeding k

l and maintains this
size until the shock S2 or S3 causes it to go bankrupt. The level k

h
corresponds to the maximum size to which a rm can grow organically
with an initial capital of yh = 1:739 or more. For a capital level below
yh, the rm size converges to an optimal capital level of k

l . If the initial
endowment is on the medium plateau between km and k

m = 4:761, the
rm will pay dividends of y   km and shrinks to size km. If there is no
negative shock (i.e., S1 = 0 is realized), the company will grow in the
next period from km directly to k

h. Therefore, the eect of the medium
(2007).
5Although the dynamics described below are prevalent in simulations with several
shocks, parameters have to be chosen with a little care to obtain graphs as neat as
those presented here.
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(b) Optimal dividend payment.
Figure 2.4: Optimal investment kt and optimal dividend payment dt as
a function of the rm's capital yt for the case of three i.i.d. shocks.
level typically occurs only for one period. A rm of size kh will retain
earnings after one shock of size S2, with the aim of reaching its previous
size. If the large shock S3 is realized, however, the capital stock falls
below yh and the rm will not grow to its previous size but rather shrink
to size kl .
2.4 Business cycles and optimal investment
The business cycle has a signicant impact on rms' optimal dividend-
investment policies. In this section we aim to study its eect within the
framework of our model. The business cycle is implemented as exogenous
market conditions with a certain degree of persistence, modeled by a
Markov process with two shocks S1 = 0 (boom) and S2 = 2 (recession)
and (symmetric) transition probabilities 11 = 22 = p. The probability
of a change of the regime is given by 12 = 21 = 1   p. The higher p,
the higher is the persistence of a state and, thus, the average duration
of regimes. The value function and the optimal policy of the rm will
depend on the current state of the shock.
We are interested in qualitative dierences in the rm's optimal pol-
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icy between booms and recessions and, in particular, the eect of the
duration of recessions (measured by p) and the depth (varying S2) on
the rm's optimal policy. The production function and parameters are
given by (2.7){(2.8) and are identical to the case studied in Section 2.3
(which is obtained by setting p = 0:5).
2.4.1 Optimal dividend-investment policy
The value function V (y; s) and the rm's optimal behavior is derived nu-
merically from (2.5). The simulation results are presented in Figure 2.5.
The dividend policy in a boom is analogous to the i.i.d. case analyzed
in Section 2.3. The rm reinvests all output up to a certain threshold,
above which dividends are paid and the investment is kept constant. This
threshold corresponds to the maximum size of the rm (i.e., the highest
level of investment, which is reached after several boom periods). The
maximum rm size in recessions, which is unobtainable but optimal for
an outside investor, is larger than that in booms, see Figure 2.5(d).
Persistence p 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.975 0.99
Expected duration of regime 2 4 10 20 40 100
Maximum size (1) 5.48 6.07 6.18 5.69 5.15 5.15
Excess investment (in %) 6.36 17.77 19.85 10.38 0.00 0.00
Net present y = 1 100 33.6 16.3 10.6 7.2 5.0
value of rm y = 2 100 56.1 25.3 15.8 11.6 8.7
in recession y = 3 100 70.3 35.5 21.4 15.6 12.1
(in % of (1)) y = 4 100 80.2 46.1 27.8 19.3 15.3
y = 5 100 86.1 55.2 34.3 22.7 18.2
Table 2.3: Maximum size of the nancially constrained rm in a boom
and excess investment relative to an unconstrained rm (which holds
capital 5:15 independent of the regime persistence). Net present value
of the rm in the recession, V (y; S2), as a percentage of the value in the
boom, V (y; S1), for dierent capital y.
Table 2.3 summarizes the impact of the persistence of regimes on
the maximum rm size in booms and the dierence in the rm value
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(d) Recession: Optimal investment.
Figure 2.5: The optimal policy of the rm in the two regimes for dier-
ent degrees of persistence. Firm value V (yt; st) and investment kt as a
function of the capital yt. Cases: p = 0:5 (dotted), p = 0:9 (dashed) and
p = 0:99 (solid). Panels (a) and (c): current state st = S1 = 0 (boom).
Panels (b) and (d): current state st = S2 = 2 (recession).
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between booms and recessions (the rm's future prospects depend on
the current regime and thus its valuation). The interpretation of the
data on the maximum rm size is as follows. First, a rm without
access to outside nancing aims to accumulate excess capital as long as
the regime persistence is not too high. The relationship between the
duration of regimes and the maximum size is inverse U-shaped. The
maximum amount of excess capital held is considerable (up to 20%).
These precautionary savings prevent (or, at least, postpone) bankruptcy
during a subsequent recession. This benet decreases with the average
duration of recessions which lowers the incentive to hold capital in excess
of the socially optimal level.
The capital stock of the rms in our model is growing in good states
(the companies invest) and decreasing in recessions. Barro (1990), using
aggregated US investment data, shows that investment is pro-cyclical.
Defaults in our model happen only in a recession which mimics the em-
pirical fact that default probabilities are larger in periods of falling stock
prices (Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Chava and Jarrow (2004)) which
coincide with falling GDP (Chen (2010)).
The eect of regime duration on the variation of the rm value be-
tween booms and recessions is as follows, see Table 2.3. Smaller rms are
harder hit by a recession. Whereas a large company will only lose about
one-third of its value when entering a recession that lasts on average 10
periods, a small rm will see its value decline to 16:3%. This is caused
by the low chances of survival in a persistent recession when the rm has
little capital.
It is more attractive for an outside investor to invest during booms
(since the same amount of capital y delivers a higher value V (y; S0) >
V (y; S1)), implying that new companies will be founded mainly during
booms. This feature matches the waves of IPOs documented by Ibbotson
and Jae (1975) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005) who show that IPOs
are more frequent in rising stock markets. A pro-cyclical pattern of
rms' output, entry and exit is also found in the computational study by
Delli Gatti et al. (2003). In their model rms face quadratic adjustment
cost of capital and exogenously specied dividends. Companies default,
if they are not able to pay the interest on their debts.
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2.4.2 Eect of the depth of recession
We next study the eect of the depth of the recession on the rm's
optimal dividend-investment policy. The depth is given by the size of
the shock S2 which will be varied in what follows (we set p = 0:9 and
S1 = 0).
Bankruptcy eventually happens irrespective of the rm's policy if
the shock is larger then the threshold S2 > 1:79. For a smaller shock
(S2  1:79), there are sustainable levels of capital, i.e., f(k; S2)  k.
The size of the shock aects the rm's behavior during recessions as well
as booms. Figure 2.6 shows the evolution of the rm's capital stock
over time during a recession lasting ve periods with the depth of the
recession as a parameter. We assume that the rm enters the recession
with the maximum capital level that it would attain in a boom.
The maximum size of the rm depends on the depth of the recession,
as shown in Figure 2.6 (a). A company survives a recession of arbitrary
length as long as its capital stock k is sustainable in a recession. The
dashed lines in Figure 2.6 indicate the minimum capital level needed to
avoid bankruptcy for a given shock size. Boundedness of the production
function f implies that, for large shocks, bankruptcy is unavoidable. For
the parametrization (2.7){(2.8), the maximum size of the shock is 1:79.
For larger shocks, it is certain that the rm will default sooner or later.
For smaller shock sizes, S2  1:76, the rm accumulates capital up
to the socially optimal level of 5:15 and, at this level, does not face any
risk of bankruptcy. If the shock S2 is larger, the rm holds more capital
in booms. Holding this `excess' capital reduces the risk of bankruptcy by
postponing eventual bankruptcy during a recession because the rm has
a capital buer. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6 (b){(d) by the `hump'
in the graph, which is located at shocks of size 1:76  S2  2:48. The
excess capital held by the rm rst increases and then decreases with the
depth of the recession. These precautionary savings are optimal because
additional capital helps to postpone bankruptcy by many periods if the
shock is just above the threshold 1:76. As the shock becomes larger,
more excess capital is required to obtain the same benet. At some
shock size (here 2:12), the costs start to outweigh the benet, leading to
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Figure 2.6: Capital stock as a function of the depth of the recession (size
of shock S2). Long-run capital stock in boom (a). Capital stock after
being in recession for one, two and ve periods: (b), (c) and (d). The
rm enters the recession with the capital stock (a). Capital stocks above
the dashed line are sustainable in a recession; capital stocks below the
dotted line lead to bankruptcy if the next period is a recession.
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lower precautionary savings.
If the shock size S2 is larger than 2:48, the rm does not hold any
excess capital in booms but rather chooses to accumulate capital up to
the socially optimal level. When entering a recession, the rm pays out
almost all of its remaining capital and keeps only a very small amount,
which ensures survival only if a boom follows in the next period. Without
instantaneous recovery, the rm will be bankrupt. If shocks are even
more extreme (such that they would lead to the destruction of all of the
rm's capital in one period of recession), the maximum size of the rm
is 3:18. The inability to survive recessions induces rms to limit their
size in the boom phase below the socially optimal one. This optimal
behavior is evidenced as the downward step observed in Figure 2.6 (a)
(and, although less visibly, in panel (b)).
2.5 Optimal policy of the central bank
We nally study the impact of the interest rate set by a central bank in
response to prevailing economic conditions. The central bank is not able
to anticipate the regime prevailing in the next period, but has to choose
the interest rate r(st) as a function of the currently observed state st. We
denote by r1 := r(S1) resp. r2 := r(S2) the interest rate set in a boom
resp. recession. (The policy will always lag the state of the economy by
one period). We further assume that there is a given average interest
rate r that the bank has to meet. In the symmetric case where, on
average, booms and recessions last for the same number of periods, this
condition can be written as (1+ r1)(1+ r2) = (1+ r
)2. We will use the
same specication of parameters as in Section 2.4 and set the persistence
of regimes to p = 0:9. The interest rate r =  1   1  5:26%. We are
interested in the central bank's optimal policy under these constraints.
The rm's decision problem is analogous to (2.2), with the discount
factor t replaced by:
t(st 1) :=
1
1 + r(s0)
 :::  1
1 + r(st 1)
for t  1. Since the rm cannot hold debt, the interest rate policy has
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an impact on the rm's optimal decision only through the discount rate.
All results on the existence of the optimal dividend-investment policy
and the value function remain valid. Table 2.4 summarizes the eect of
the interest rate policy on the nancially constrained rm's decisions.
Standard policy const. Non-standard policy
Boom interest rate r1 (in %) 8.26 7.26 6.26 5.26 4.26 3.26 2.26
Recession interest rate r2 (in %) 2.34 3.30 4.27 5.26 6.27 7.30 8.35
Constrained rm
Maximum size in boom (1) 6.24 6.21 6.19 6.18 6.28 6.27 6.27
Minimum size in recession 1.54 1.40 1.24 1.10 1.07 1.07 1.07
Unconstrained rm
Optimal capital in boom (4) 4.65 4.81 4.98 5.15 5.34 5.53 5.73
Difference (1) and (4) (in %) 34.08 29.11 24.37 19.85 17.64 13.37 9.34
Table 2.4: Impact of the central bank's interest rate policy on the size and
market value of nancially constrained rms in booms and recessions.
Capital stocks of an unconstrained rm is provided as a benchmark.
The maximum size of the rm varies with the interest rate policy. The
eect is quite unexpected because the maximum size of the rm increases
with a non-constant policy irrespectively whether the `boom interest
rate' is increased or decreased. A higher interest rate during booms leads
to stronger discounting of future boom dividend payments but lower
discounting of payments during recessions. This makes precautionary
savings more attractive because it enables the rm to survive longer in
a recession. On the other hand, a higher interest rate in recessions (a
rather unorthodox policy) has the eect that payments made during a
recession is valued more by the owners of the rm than postponing it
because of the higher discounting. This induces the rms to accumulate
more capital in booms and pay high dividends in recessions, entailing
an extremely high bankruptcy risk. The excess capital stock (last row
in Table 2.4) held by the nancially constrained rms in good times
(booms) is increasing the lower the interest rate is set in recessions.
The minimum size (dened here as smallest the capital stock at which
the rm chooses to continue operations in a recession rather than paying
out almost all remaining capital) increases when the recession interest
rate decreases. The eect of this standard interest rate policy, however,
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is driven by the high boom interest rate. In a recession the rm does
not pay any dividends, their payment is only resumed in a boom which
makes the capital holdings at the end of a recession more valuable. The
rm therefore holds on to a higher capital stock in a recession.
Summarizing, the standard policy of low interest rates in recessions
gives nancially constrained rms an incentive to retain more of its earn-
ings in good times (booms) and to stay longer in business in bad times
(recession). In this sense, investments happen in booms out of precau-
tionary motives. The persistence of regimes plays a vital role in the rm's
decision, in the presence of i.i.d. shocks no adjustment to the business
cycle would occur.
In the theoretical models of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), rms with limited
access to the credit market (due to information asymmetries) cannot
nance protable investments because of macroeconomic shocks which
reduce the value of the rms' collateral. The presence of this invest-
ment pattern is conrmed empirically by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
and Bernanke et al. (1996). Monetary policy is found by Cooley and
Quadrini (2006) to have a stronger (in terms of output and debts) im-
pact of nancially constrained small rms.
In our model, in contrast, nancially constrained rms reduce their
investment less than unconstrained rms at the outset of a recession
because they accumulated precautionary savings in the previous boom.
However, our results are about a dierent type of rm (those that do not
have any access to credit) and, in addition, rms face persistent (rather
than i.i.d.) shocks. We would argue that precautionary saving motives
of nancially constrained rm are more important under persistent re-
cession regimes.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the optimal behavior of a nancially constrained rm
in the presence of additive production shocks. The model is one of
pure capital accumulation under i.i.d. as well as Markov (business cycle)
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shocks. Several stylized economic and nancial characteristics of the rm
life cycle can be illustrated within this simple model. The dynamic cap-
tures the higher default risk, productivity and volatility of small rms,
the concentration of dividend payments on large rms, a falling Tobin's
q in rm size, the leverage eect, the value premium, the pro-cyclically
investment and rm entries, and counter-cyclical default probabilities.
We also study the impact of a central bank's interest policy on rms'
precautionary savings and their optimal size.
The approach oers several avenues for future research without losing
much of the simplicity of the model. It would be interesting to weaken
the (extreme) assumption of lack of access to any outside nance by
allowing rms to raise at least some capital from, e.g., venture capitalists.
The assumption on the risk-neutrality of the owner-entrepreneur can be
replaced by other (neoclassical or behavioral) preferences. One could also
study the impact of a proportional shock in the presence of xed costs
rather than imposing an additive output shock as in our model. Finally,
competition of several rms in an output market (with some stochastic
aggregate demand function) can also be studied in a generalized model.
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Article 3
Market Selection in an
Evolutionary Market
with Nonstationary
Dividends
Abstract: Identifying investment strategies that will survive in the long run is
a main endeavor in the eld of evolutionary nance. The evolutionary perspective
on the nancial market considers rather long time horizons, making the creation
and disappearance of rms a highly relevant factor in determining such strategies.
However, this factor has not been examined in existing research. This paper seeks to
ll the gap in the literature by simulating dividends and investment strategies on the
basis of initial public oerings (IPOs) and defaults. This paper simulates the evolution
of the wealth shares of various investment strategies in a setup wherein dividends are
nonstationary. The results show that a modied version of the generalized Kelly rule
dominates competing investment strategies in terms of nal wealth. This nding
agrees with the existing literature, which suggests that the generalized Kelly rule has
good chances of surviving or even taking over the entire market in dierent setups.
However, the creation and dissolution of a rm can only be observed once in the
life of a company; therefore, using only a long time series of one company alone is
not the most optimal method of estimating the probability that a rm will default.
Instead, the dividend process must be understood by examining similar companies.
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This completely alters the implementation of the generalized Kelly rule compared
with the way it is applied in the existing evolutionary nance literature, even when
the dividend processes of the companies involved are independent of each other.
3.1 Introduction
Financial analysis is based on the rationale that companies with similar
characteristics exhibit a comparable rm value. One possible explana-
tion for this may be that events that can only be observed once in the
entire life of a company have a tremendous impact on the future of that
company. Examples of such events are the rst blockbuster product of a
biotechnology company, the development of the iPhone by Apple Inc., or
the default of a company. Moreover, such events can only be studied by
examining similar companies. Further, this paper seeks to demonstrate
that, in a market with several investment strategies, investors who in-
corporate cross-sectional information (i.e., information from other rms)
in their investment decisions perform better than those who do not. In
other words, the share of the total wealth accumulated using the strate-
gies of the former increases more quickly than that accrued by those of
the latter. Accordingly, strategies that perform poorly are marginalized
in the long run. Briey, this paper will show that the market selects
investors who use cross-sectional information and that other strategies
disappear in the long term.
The idea that the market selects investors who use all available in-
formation and who act rationally was initially proposed by Friedman
(1953) and Fama (1965). According to these researchers, irrational in-
vestors earn lower returns and disappear in the long run. However, Long
et al. (1990) used a partial equilibrium model to show that the eects
of decisions made by irrational investors on stock prices cannot always
be corrected by rational investors because the latter are risk averse. In
addition, Blume and Easley (1992) proved that a rational investor who
does not maximize a logarithmic utility function can be driven out of
a complete market by some irrational investors, assuming that every
investor has the same savings rate. For exogenous asset prices, Kelly
(1956) developed a theory of maximizing expected returns on long-term
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(nancial) investments. To do so, the investor has to bet his beliefs.
Maximizing the growth rate as the Kelly rule does is equivalent to max-
imizing a logarithmic utility function. Therefore, a slightly irrational
investor who almost maximizes a logarithmic utility function can push
a rational investor who maximizes a nonlogarithmic utility function out
of the market on the basis of the higher growth rate of his wealth as in
Blume and Easley (1992).
Samuelson (1979) argued that individuals should maximize their util-
ity (and therefore their happiness), regardless of whether they survive
in the market. However, this paper focuses on identifying the strategies
that survive a market selection process, rather than on making people
happy. Because of the exogenously given savings rate, the asset allo-
cations in Blume and Easley (1992) are neither Pareto optimal nor do
they have a general equilibrium model. Sandroni (2000) and Blume and
Easley (2006) investigated market selection in a general equilibrium set-
ting with complete markets, and found that rational investors survive
when all investors have the same discount rate, but the same does not
apply in incomplete markets. These are addressed in detail by Evstigneev
et al. (2006), and Evstigneev et al. (2008) showed that if all strategies
and dividends possess Markov properties or that dividends are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the generalized Kelly rule will
drive all strategies that depend only on the actual state of the world out
of the market, given that the initial wealth of the competing strategies is
small enough (this property is called local evolutionary stability). This
is further generalized by Amir et al. (2009b); they found that the gener-
alized Kelly rule is asymptotically unique among all survival strategies
that depend only on the history of states. This implies that the Kelly
rule has almost surely a strictly positive wealth share that is independent
of the strategy of the other investors. However, asset prices depend not
only on the past states but also on the strategies of the other investors.
Therefore, these results are for many relevant strategies as for example
momentum strategies not applicable. However, simulation results from
Tupak (2009) indicate that the generalized Kelly rule will dominate,
given that the true parameters of the dividend process are known.1
1The generalized Kelly rule also applies to one-period assets with an arbitrary
dividend process, see Evstigneev et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2005), and
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What types of investment strategies survive if dividends are nonsta-
tionary and assets can be created and dissolved? Econometricians have
long debated whether dividends contain a unit root or follow a stationary
process, and the discussion is still not completely resolved.2 Summariz-
ing this debate, the test statistics of the unit root tests suggest that
the hypothesis of a unit root in dividends is more dicult to maintain
than the hypothesis of a unit root in stock prices. Further, Harris and
Tzavalis (2004) have rejected the unit root hypothesis for dividends, and
DeJong and Whiteman (1991) have also found it implausible. Therefore,
this paper will concentrate on the implications of the second market fea-
ture, which states that assets can be created and destroyed. This feature
automatically generates a nonstationary dividend process because many
companies, including large ones that are very stable in the short term,
did not exist, say, 200 years ago. To determine strategies that will sur-
vive in the long run, it is therefore important to consider the fact that
companies can disappear and new companies will enter the market.
It is often assumed that dividends are driven by one and the same
process over the entire life of a company. This is a very simplistic as-
sumption: for instance, why should a small startup have the same risk
and expected returns as a large concern? Mueller (1972) suggested a
rm life-cycle: small rms are more protable and face greater risks
than large ones, but the large rms pay greater dividends. This life-
cycle is driven by the idea that small rms tend to be more innovative
but have diculties in accessing the credit market and are therefore un-
able to pay dividends. Hall (1987) and Evans (1987a,b) found support
for this theory in their work on US manufacturing rms, which led them
to conclude that small rms grow more quickly and are riskier than
larger rms. Similarly, Dhawan (2001) discovered that small US man-
ufacturers are more productive and riskier than large ones. Fama and
French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006),
and DeAngelo et al. (2006) provided empirical evidence for the life-cycle
hypothesis of dividend policy, which holds that large rms pay more div-
Amir et al. (2005).
2For arguments surrounding the existence of a unit root in dividends, see Shiller
(1981), Kleidon (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1988),
DeJong and Whiteman (1991), and Harris and Tzavalis (2004).
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idends than small, growing companies. In addition to the possibility of
default and the constructible and destructible nature of rms, this paper
will consider the fact that small rms with small dividend payments may
become large rms with high dividend payments.
The main aim of this paper is to nd a surviving strategy for nonsta-
tionary dividends modeled on the creation and destruction of companies.
Since the generalized Kelly rule is not feasible in this setup, the adopted
strategy ensures that funds that are invested into a company are propor-
tional to the expected net present value (NPV) of that companys divi-
dends. This paper makes several observations. First, the NPV-strategy
is able to dominate the markets in simulations; this indicates that the
results from the innitely lived assets seem to generalize to this setup.
Second, many observations are required if the parameters of the process
and the portfolio weights have to be estimated from past observations of
the dividends. If past observations of dividends are lacking, a generalized
Kelly rule with estimated parameters can be driven out of the market us-
ing simple strategies. This conrms the theoretical ndings pertaining to
innitely lived assets obtained by Amir et al. (2009a) and the simulation
ndings for stationary dividends obtained by Tupak (2009). Third, if a
wrong dividend process is assumed, the optimal Kelly rule can produce
worse results than a nave strategy that invests the same amount in each
asset. This is shown in a case were the investor assumed the dividends to
be i.i.d.,3 while in reality, the dividends followed a nonstationary process.
Section 3.2 provides empirical evidence that the creation and disap-
pearance of companies is an important factor in the dividend process and
discusses further stylized facts. Section 3.3 presents a simple and mini-
malist dividend model that conforms to the literature discussed and the
empirical evidence presented herein. Section 3.4 describes the market
selection model in which the investment strategies detailed in Section 3.5
will compete. Section 3.6 simulates some models and Section 3.7 sum-
marizes the papers ndings.
3This assumption was used in the simulations of Hens et al. (2002), Hens and
Schenk-Hoppe (2004), and Tupak (2009).
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3.2 Empirical evidence on the birth, death,
and dividends of companies
The present section motivates the assumptions for the dividend process
described in the next section. This section mainly shows that, over the
last 40 years, many new rms have been founded and are default, a fact
that is often neglected in evolutionary nance. Furthermore, dividend
payments are largely issued from a small number of companies, and the
percentages of dividends paid by dierent sectors change over time. All
of this demonstrates that dividends are highly nonstationary.
To illustrate these points, a sample of 25,272 active and inactive
North American companies that are listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the NAS-
DAQ Stock Market is used. The data have been obtained from the Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and they are for the period
1973 through 2009. The starting date of 1973 was chosen because that is
the earliest year from which AMEX and NASDAQ data are available. A
company is considered active as long as it is listed on a certain stock ex-
change. Within this period, the number of active companies varies from
5,267 to 9,843 per year; the average is 7,138 companies per year. The
large dierence between the number of active companies per year and
the number of active and inactive companies indicates that many rms
were newly founded and that a large number of companies disappeared.
A company is active for an average time period of 10.51 years, and the
median is lower: eight years. Figure 3.1 shows the number of companies
that remain in the sample for any given number of years. Approximately
a quarter of all rms were in the sample for less than four years, thus
making it extremely dicult to determine the value of an asset on the
basis of its past dividends. Therefore, cross-sectional information may be
helpful in ascertaining the value and risk and therefore also the optimal
amounts of investment in such assets.
The largest part of the variation in the number of active rms can
be explained by mergers and acquisitions (see Table 3.1). Of the 18,837
delistings reported by the CRSP from 1973 to 2009, a total of 9,782 are
3.2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 3-7
Number of Years a Company Was in Sample
N
um
be
r o
f C
om
pa
ni
es
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
50
00
Figure 3.1: Number of years a company was in the sample (CRSP data
from 1973 to 2009).
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Year Active Mergers Liquidation Dropped
1973 5,954 103 5 354
1974 5,558 99 11 168
1975 5,398 83 10 80
1976 5,415 101 17 53
1977 5,390 155 18 61
1978 5,344 191 11 70
1979 5,267 209 16 51
1980 5,431 164 24 83
1981 5,794 155 15 88
1982 6,008 172 21 159
1983 6,606 173 11 164
1984 6,862 210 13 229
1985 6,982 248 16 325
1986 7,375 225 26 319
1987 7,642 185 5 225
1988 7,655 352 12 312
1989 7,390 273 13 318
1990 7,218 197 9 339
1991 7,251 119 12 367
1992 7,538 135 9 380
1993 8,108 177 3 170
1994 8,676 279 3 198
1995 9,055 358 9 233
1996 9,608 437 10 174
1997 9,843 511 7 255
1998 9,695 603 5 422
1999 9,374 613 11 394
2000 9,055 631 11 326
2001 8,337 463 7 473
2002 7,653 259 17 390
2003 7,228 257 11 297
2004 7,064 265 17 147
2005 7,043 268 7 162
2006 6,971 312 7 123
2007 7,000 392 8 184
2008 6,563 250 22 230
2009 6,237 158 36 267
Total 9,782 465 8,590
Table 3.1: Active companies (at the end of the year) and reasons for
delisting (CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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attributable to this source. The next most important reason for deletion
is being dropped from the stock exchange. The number of dropped
companies is much higher than the number of liquidated companies, and
this indicates that the big stock exchanges delist companies with nancial
problems before the worst happens. Table 3.2 provides detailed reasons
for dropping the companies: 1,282 companies were delisted because of
insucient capital, 930 because their price was too low, 647 because of
insolvency, and 982 because they did not pay exchange fees. Therefore,
the proportion of defaulting companies accounts for at least 12.5% of
all companies, based on a time period of 36 years. The number of new
companies is also signicant: 19,318 such companies emerged during the
period under study, working out to an average of 536.6 per year. These
gures plainly demonstrate that long-run investment strategies should
not neglect the fact that rms have nite lives.
Neither the numbers of delisted companies nor the reasons these com-
panies were delisted are constant over time (see Table 3.1). Typically,
everything happens in waves. For example, many new companies were
founded between 1991 and 1997, and a merger wave occurred from 1996
to 2001. Between 1998 and 2004, the number of companies fell and the
number of liquidations increased tremendously, and this phenomenon
was repeated in 2008 and 2009. Due to this cyclical pattern, the num-
ber of companies also moves in waves. These ndings correspond with
the initial public oering (IPO) waves discovered by Ibbotson and Jae
(1975), the procyclical behavior of IPOs noted by Pastor and Veronesi
(2005), and the countercyclical behavior of default probabilities observed
in Vassalou and Xing (2004), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Chen (2010).
To aggregate dividends data from the CRSP, the number of outstand-
ing shares on the day before the ex-distribution date must be multiplied
by the dividend per share and then aggregated over one calendar year.
For these calculations, only cash dividends were taken into account (i.e.,
subscription rights etc. were excluded from the estimations). Figure 3.2
aggregates the dividends by sector, and Figure 3.2(b) shows the relative
weight of dividends being paid by dierent sectors. Until 2007, the div-
idends paid by the nancial sector increased at a faster rate than those
paid by the manufacturing industry and the transport and telecommu-
nication sector. After the nancial crisis in 2008, the dividends of the
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Reason for Dropping Firms
Issue stopped trading on current exchange{reason unavailable 965
Issue transferred from current exchange to Mutual Funds 18
Issue transferred from current exchange to Boston Exchange 33
Issue transferred from current exchange to Midwest Exchange 2
Issue transferred from current exchange to Pacic Stock Exchange 17
Issue transferred from current exchange to Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change
3
Issue transferred from current exchange to Toronto Stock Exchange 3
Issue began trading over the counter 375
Delisted by current exchange{insucient number of market makers 464
Delisted by current exchange{insucient number of shareholders 170
Delisted by current exchange{price fell below acceptable level 930
Delisted by current exchange{insucient capital, surplus, and/or eq-
uity
1,282
Delisted by current exchange{insucient (or noncompliance with
rules of) oat or assets
707
Delisted by current exchange{company request (no reason given) 512
Delisted by current exchange{company request (deregistration owing
to going private)
81
Delisted by current exchange{bankruptcy (declared insolvent) 647
Delisted by current exchange{company request (oer rescinded and
issue withdrawn by underwriter)
15
Delisted by current exchange{delinquent in ling and nonpayment of
fees
982
Delisted by current exchange{failure to register under Section 12G of
the Securities Exchange Act
112
Delisted by current exchange{failure to meet exception or equity re-
quirements
167
Delisted by current exchange{denied temporary exception require-
ment
10
Delisted by current exchange{does not meet exchanges nancial guide-
lines for continued listing
867
Delisted by current exchange{protection of investors and the public
interest
137
Delisted by current exchange{corporate governance violation 13
Conversion of a closed-end investment company to an open-end in-
vestment company
47
Delisted by current exchange{required by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC)
31
Table 3.2: Reasons that companies were dropped from their exchange
(CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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(b) Industrial sector dividends relative to total
dividends
Figure 3.2: Dividends by Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) sector
and SIC dividends relative to total dividends, that is, the dividends of
one sector divided by total dividends (CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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nancial sector reduced drastically. This reveals persistent shifts in the
relative weight of dividends being paid by dierent sectors. Such shifts
are quite natural; the railroad and textile industries, for instance, were
much more important one hundred years ago than they are today. Long-
term shifts are incompatible with the assumption of i.i.d. dividend shares
of the dierent sectors (or companies), and this assumption has often
been made by parts of the evolutionary nance literature.
No dividends were paid in 57.2% of all company years, which are
dened as the years during which a company is active. In 5.5% of all
company years, dividends increased from zero to a positive amount and
in 5.3% of the years, dividends fell to zero. This indicates that large
variations in dividends are a very characteristic feature of dividend time
series. Furthermore, the top 5% of dividend payers4 distributed, on
average, 78% of all dividends. This percentage varied between 71% and
85%, reaching its lowest in 1979 and peaking in 2001. These gures show
that dividend payment is enormously concentrated among a few rms
and that this concentration trended upward over time.
This section has noted several patterns relating to company numbers
and dividend payment. To reect these patterns, a long-run dividend
model should exhibit the following features: a dynamic number of com-
panies, wave-like changes in the number of companies, some large jumps
in dividends, concentration of dividend payments among a small fraction
of rms, and the capacity to accommodate shifts of dividends between
dierent sectors.
3.3 Dividend model
This section will present a dividend model that is based on the stylized
facts established in the previous section. Within this model, rms can be
born and default, and a few large corporations issue a large percentage
of dividend payments. In other words, small, young rms (startups) pay
only a small dividend and are at high risk of defaulting, but have oppor-
4The top 5% of dividend payers constitute 5% of the companies paying the highest
total dividends.
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tunities to grow into concerns, which pay large dividends. To provide
more detail, this model assumes an economy that consists of three types
of companies: IPOs, startups, and concerns. IPOs are rms that have
newly entered the market. In the entering period, investors pay a cer-
tain amount for an IPO and do not receive a dividend, and in the second
period, the IPO automatically becomes a startup. Startups pay low div-
idends and may grow into concerns, which are mature rms that spend
large sums on dividends but cannot grow further. These characteristics
reect the empirical evidence produced by Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b),
and Dhawan (2001), which demonstrates that younger rms have higher
growth rates than older rms. Both types of companies can default and
a company may change types in any period (a dead company being one
such type). That is to say, a startup can default, remain a startup, or
become a concern, and a concern can either default or remain a concern.
A company that has defaulted is dead forever. The transition proba-
bilities in Figure 3.3 are given as follows: pSD is the probability that a
startup will default during a period and pSS is the probability that the
startup will remain a startup. If the startup survives, then pSD is the
probability that it will default during the next period. The probability
that a startup becomes a concern is then given by pSC = 1  pSS   pSD.
A concern may remain a concern or default, and the probabilities for
these events are pCC and pCD = 1  pCC .
Type changes are independent between companies and over time. If
pSD and pCD are strictly positive, every company will default at one
point in time, that is, if t ! 1 the probability that a company is de-
faulted converges to 1. To guarantee that some companies will always
exist, the number of IPOs in every period, nnew, exceeds zero. The
number of startups, concerns, and IPOs are represented by nSt , n
C
t , and
nnew, respectively. The long-run averages of the number of startups and
concerns can be calculated as follows:
E
 
nS

=
nnew
1  pSS and E
 
nC

=
pSC  nnew
(1  pSS)(1  pSC) : (3.1)
Every year, every startup pays a xed strictly positive dividend DS , and
each concern pays a xed dividend DC > DS . The xed dividend DS
remains constant from the foundation of a startup to the point where
3-14 ARTICLE 3. MARKET SELECTION MODEL
Figure 3.3: Development of a company over time. An IPO becomes
a startup, a startup can become a concern or disappear after several
periods, and a concern will exist for several periods and then disappear.
The probability of each event is presented beside the arrows.
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it either becomes a concern or dies. Should it become a concern, the
dividend of the new concern experiences a huge upward jump; should it
die, however, DS permanently falls to zero. A concern pays DC every
year until it is dissolved. Therefore, the sum of all dividends paid by
startups in a single period is the result of nSt D
S and the total of all
dividends paid by concerns during the same period is nCt D
C . Since IPOs
do not pay dividends, it follows that the total dividend paid out in period
t is the sum of the dividends paid by the startups and the concerns. The
general structure of this dividend model is not completely new. Hurley
and Johnson (1994) used a similar trinomial model to price individual
stocks.
This model incorporates most of the features mentioned at the end of
Section 3.2. The number of companies is dynamic and undergoes wave-
like changes. Dividend payments can be parameterized so that they
are largely paid by concerns and only fractionally disbursed by startups
and are therefore concentrated among the concerns. To ensure that the
simulation problem in Section 3.6 is tractable, the number of IPOs in
every period is set to one. Simulations show that, with this assumption,
the number of startups and concerns is changing drastically over time.
Adding waves in the number of IPOs, as observed in the data of Section
3.2, would strengthen this eect further. Mergers are not included in
the model because they do not matter, assuming that the dividends and
portfolio weights of the new rm are the sum of the merging compa-
nies. Owing to the fact that new companies enter the market at all the
times and existing companies disappear in the long run, changes in the
dividends between several sectors can be explained by the model: in a
certain time frame, mainly textile rms could enter the market, while in
another period, only IT rms, and so on. That is, the sector of rms
entering the market changes over time. After a certain period, the IPOs
become concerns and pay considerable dividends, thereby leading to an
increase in the importance of the sector. If no new rm of a certain
sector enters the market, the sector disappears in the long run. As a
whole, the model is very simple, but it includes many elements that are
important in the long-run dividend process.
This paper aims to simulate the wealth shares of dierent investment
strategies. For this, dividends must also be simulated. Table 3.3 shows
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Startup Concern Miscellaneous
DS 1 DC 40.1 nnew 1
pSD 2.3% pCD 0.6% 0 5%
pSS 97.0% pCC 99.4%
pSC 0.7%
Table 3.3: Simulation parameters calibrated on CRSP data
the parameters of the dividend process. These are calibrated with CRSP
data for the years 1973 to 2009 in order to correlate the dividend process
with the stylized facts underlying the dividend model. Table 3.2 does
not conrm whether companies that were dropped from their exchanges
were delisted owing to nancial problems. Because of that uncertainty,
the decision regarding which type a company belongs to is based on
market capitalization: a company that has belonged to the top decile of
all companies for at least two years is classied as a concern from that
point until it defaults. Companies that neither qualied as concerns nor
belonged to the lowest decile for at least two years in a row are classied
as startups. A startup defaults if its value remains in the lowest decile
for the rest of its life, whereas a concern defaults if its value remains
below the largest 30% of all active companies for the rest of its life. The
default threshold for concerns may seem high, but the market value of
a concern dened as dead is approximately ve times lower than the
market value at which a startup becomes a concern. In other words, this
threshold ensures that a concern must have suered substantial losses
before it defaults. The dividends of a startup, DS , is normalized to
one. The concern dividends, DC , are determined in two steps. First, the
quotient obtained by dividing every year the average of concern dividends
through the average of startup dividends. This results in the dividends
of the concerns in every year (DS is normed to 1). Given that, the
dividend of the concern is the average over all the years from which this
quotient is derived. This dividend process is unrealistic for two reasons:
rst, it does not consider mergers, and second, it assigns equal dividend
amounts to all company types. However, these simplications allow us
to observe the eects of the creation, growth, and default of rms on the
wealth of investment strategies, which is the main purpose of this model.
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3.4 Market selection model
As stated in the previous section, the dividend model is based on ex-
ogenously given dividends. In the next step of the dividend process, the
companies generating these dividends are traded in a market and their
shares may be purchased by several investors. This section will describe
how the wealth of diering investment strategies and with that the asset
returns evolve over time.
The state of nature in t is !(t) and is described by the dividend
payment of all companies at t. Therefore, the history of states equals
!t = (!(0); : : : ; !(t)). Given this, the percentage of wealth consumed by
investment strategy i, at t in an economy with I investment strategies is
dened as i0;t (!
t), where i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig. This percentage is assumed to
be constant over time and identical for all strategies because this paper
focuses on comparing the performance of investment strategies, rather
than analyzing the inuence of the savings rate. Further, this assumption
allows us to simplify i0;t (!
t) to 0, which is important because it elim-
inates the possibility that an irrational strategy will survive by having a
higher savings rate than rational strategies. In such a case, the rational
strategy has a higher return, but the irrational strategy achieves a higher
growth rate through a higher savings ratio and thereby marginalizing the
rational strategy in the long run (see, e.g., Blume and Easley (1992)).
The percentage of wealth invested by shareholder i in company k
at time t is represented by ik;t (!
t). Nonexistent companies must have
portfolio weights of zero; therefore, ik;t (!
t) = 0 for all companies that
do not exist at t. Every strategy can invest in any existing company,
but short selling is not allowed; that is, 0  ik;t (!t)  1. This budget
constraint implies that
P
k 
i
k;t (!
t) = 1. Note that the sum over k can
be interpreted as the sum over all past, actual, and future companies.
However, it is not possible to invest in nonexistent companies, so this
equates to adding up only the investments made in companies existing
in period t. The wealth of investor i in t is wit and the price of asset k in
t is qk;t. Therefore, the number of shares held by investor i in company
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k at time t is
ik;t =
(
ik;t(!
t)wit
qk;t
if company k exists in t
0 otherwise:
(3.2)
If the number of stocks issued by a company is normalized to one and if
all stocks need to be held by someone, the price of one stock in company
k at t, or the market capitalization of that company, can be given as
follows:
qk;t =
IX
i=1
ik;t
 
!t

wit =: k;t
 
!t

wt (3.3)
wherewt is a column vector including the wealth of all investors in period
t and k;t (!
t) is a row vector with the portfolio weights of all investors
in asset k during period t. The asset prices can be written in matrix
notation as follows:
qt = t
 
!t

wt; (3.4)
where qt is a price vector including all companies and t (!
t) is a matrix
of all portfolio weights of period t. The number of rows represents the
number of assets, and the number of columns represents the number of
investors. Finally, the vector wt includes the wealth of every investor in
t. The wealth of an investor in t+1 is equal to the value of his portfolio
plus the dividend payment:
wit+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

ik;t: (3.5)
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The dividends of asset k at t+ 1 are represented by Dkt+1
 
!t+1

. Note
that qk;t+1 and 
i
k;t depend on wt and k;t (!
t). The next step is to
express the wealth dynamic in terms of exogenously given variables as
the dividends and the strategy that depends only on the state of the
world, !t. The preceding equation can be expressed in matrix notation
as follows:
wt+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

k;t; (3.6)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tqt+1; (3.7)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1; (3.8)
where the last equation follows from equation (3.4). The number of
shares held by all investors in all companies, k;t, is a column vector
with the length of the number of investors and t combines the vectors
k;t into a matrix in which the number of investors is designated by the
number of rows and the number of assets by the number of columns.
Furthermore, Dt+1
 
!t+1

is the vector denoting the dividends of all
assets in t + 1, given the state !t+1. Writing wt+1 on one side of the
equation results in 
I tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1 = tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (3.9)
The evolution of wealth is therefore
wt+1 =
 
I tt+1
 
!t+1
 1
tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (3.10)
The next step is to check whether the wealth of all investors in t + 1,
wt+1, and the stock prices during the same period, qt+1, are always
nonnegative. This is important because negative asset prices make no
economic sense and negative wealth presents the problem of whether
the investor will be able to pay back his or her debts. The system can
be considered well-dened if the wealth of all investors and prices of all
assets are nonnegative during all t. This requires three assumptions:
Assumption 1. Consumption takes place and does not violate the rule
that 0 < i0;t (!
t) < 1 for all i, t, and !t.
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Assumption 2. At least one completely diversied portfolio rule is in
force: an i exists such that ik;t (!
t) > 0 for all existing k, t, and !t.
Assumption 3. If a company, k, is dead or not yet founded at t, then
nobody invests in it (i.e., ik;t (!
t) = 0).
Proposition 1. Suppose that w0 > 0 and assumptions 1 to 3 are satis-
ed. Then, the evolution of wealth (3.10) is well dened in all t < 1.
Mainly, the proposition holds because this setup is constructed so
that both t and t (!
t) contain many zeros; consequently, the step
from t to t+ 1 is only inuenced by companies existing in both periods.
Considering this, the proof for Proposition 1 is analogous to that supplied
by Evstigneev et al. (2006). Since the chief eect of Proposition 1 is to
enable proper model simulation, the restriction to a nite number of time
periods is not problematic.
The model may appear very similar to that of Evstigneev et al. (2006)
or Amir et al. (2009a), but it is not possible to show that the generalized
Kelly rule is locally evolutionary stable5 or is a (unique) surviving strat-
egy. A main prerequisite of their result is that consumption is a constant
share of total wealth. In the present setup, shareholders pay a certain
amount of money to establish a newly founded IPO, and this amount
depends on the investment strategies of the investors and is therefore
typically not constant over time. This fraction of investor wealth leaves
the economy and is hence also a form of consumption, but because it is
not constant over time, it is not possible to conrm the existence of prin-
ciples such as local evolutionary stability or a unique surviving strategy.
Results on these subjects are therefore provided by simulations. How-
ever, before this, the strategies to be considered for simulations must be
dened.
5A strategy that drives every other strategy out of the market if the initial wealth
of the other strategy is small enough is considered locally evolutionary stable.
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3.5 Strategies
This paper has thus far delineated a dividend model and an evolutionary
market selection model and will now proceed to discuss investor strate-
gies, which must be known in order to simulate the entire market. Which
strategies should compete in this model? A good starting point may be
a generalized version of the Kelly rule:
k;t =
0
1  0
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t ;
where dk;t are the relative dividends of asset k at t (i.e., dk;t =
DktP
iD
i
t
).
The strategy  has a probability of one of resulting in a positive wealth
share when applied to both short (one-period) and innitely long-lived
assets see Amir et al. (2009a,b). However, neither this nor other results
from literature dealing with local and evolutionary stability apply to the
strategy  in a market wherein new companies can be established or
rms can default. Furthermore, the strategy is not directly applicable
in the setup of this paper. This is because new companies will enter
the market in future periods and will, therefore, pay positive relative
dividends. These assets are not included in the calculation of , which
must therefore not sum up to one. This issue can be circumvented by
including only those companies that existed during t in the calculation of
the relative dividends in the formula for k;t. From a practical point of
view, the lack of a closed-form solution for calculating  is a more prob-
lematic issue. The strategy could be estimated via simulation, but doing
so over an innite time horizon would be time consuming and/or im-
precise. Moreover, the evolutionary setup requires that this calculation
be performed thousands of times, which was not practicable. Portfolio
weights proportional to the NPV of the companies dividends provided
a close substitute. The NPV of asset k with discount factor 1   0 is
dened by
NPVk =
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
Dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t :
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The NPVs of the dividends of the dierent types of companies are as
follows:
NPVconcern =
(1  0) pCCDC
1  (1  0) pCC
NPVstartup = (1  0)
pSSD
S + pSC
 
DC +NPVconcern

1  (1  0) pSS
NPVIPO = (1  0)
 
NPVstartup+D
S

:
If NPVk;t is dened as the NPV of asset k in period t, then the strategy
based on the relative NPVs is as follows:
1k;t
 
!t

=
NPVk;tP
j NPVj;t
:
To nd out whether the NPV strategy approximates the generalized
Kelly rule, the portfolio weights of both strategies were calculated for
several parameterizations and then compared. To determine the port-
folio weights of the Kelly rule, the relative dividends of the companies
were simulated 1,000 periods ahead, and the Kelly strategy was calcu-
lated using these dividends. This process was repeated 10,000 times.
The average of these 10,000 realizations gives . This result not only
shows that the formula for the NPV is similar to the formula for . In
fact, the NPV strategy and the generalized Kelly rule are equivalent if
total dividends in the economy are constant over time. The rest of the
paper mainly uses one standard parameterization, which can be found in
Table 3.3. The parameters of the standard parameterization are varied
in Table 3.4, and the dierence between the allocation of the Kelly rule,
, and the NPV-strategy, 1 of these variations are presented in Panels
A to D.6 The total share of wealth invested in concerns, startups, and
IPOs is calculated, and the percentage dierence between the generalized
Kelly rule and the NPV strategy is shown in Table 3.4. In most cases, the
dierence is well below 0.5%, which shows that the results produced by
the two strategies are close to being identical. However, the dierences
between the two strategies widen massively when the default probability
6The parameters DS , pSS = 1   pSC   pSD and pCC = 1   pCD are not varied
either because they are normed to one or given by the other parameters.
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for concerns achieves 5% or more; overall, a generalized Kelly rule in-
vestor would invest almost 4% more in concerns than an NPV investor
would under such circumstances. This indicates that dierences exist
between these two types of investors. Since the typical default prob-
ability for concerns is 1% or smaller, this dierence has no impact on
the simulations performed in the rest of this paper, wherein the NPV
strategy is used as a proxy for the generalized Kelly rule because it can
be calculated much faster than the latter can.
The previous strategy is called the theoretical NPV strategy since the
parameters are assumed to be known. But in reality, the true parameters
of the dividend model are unknown. Therefore, these parameters are
estimated on the basis of past (simulated) data in order to compare this
model with other models. DC and DS can be directly observed from the
data, thereby making probability estimation quite simple. For example,
pCD can be estimated by dividing the number of defaults of concerns by
the sum of the active concern years of all the concerns plus the number of
defaults. This estimator is also a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE).
With the estimated parameters, the competing strategy 2k;t (!
t) can be
calculated in the same way as 1k;t (!
t), and it is called the empirical
NPV strategy.
The next step is to nd some interesting alternative strategies. Hens
et al. (2002) and Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004) applied a simple strat-
egy; they used average relative dividends as a proxy for . In the case
of i.i.d. dividends, this is the Kelly rule. Therefore this strategy is
3k;t
 
!t

=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
Dkt i
 
!t i
P
j D
j
t i (!t i)
:=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
dkt i(!
t i):
The number of periods over which averaging has been conducted is rep-
resented by  and the factor c3 is chosen such that
PK
k=0 
3
k;t (!
t) = 1.
This constant is needed because the environment of the existing compa-
nies diers in every time period and it is therefore not a given that the
full budget of the agents is used after the averaging. This paper uses
this strategy with the  values of 100, 20, and 0. Considering a long
history to estimate the relative dividends is eective in the case of i.i.d.
relative dividends. In that case, the strategy converges to . This is
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Panel A: Varying DC
DC 2 10 50 100
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.021% -0.001% 0.001% -0.003%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.156% 0.102% 0.165% 0.205%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.177% -0.101% -0.166% -0.202%
Panel B: Varying pSC
pSC 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.031% -0.006% -0.004% 0.000%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.304% 0.258% 0.198% 0.214%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.336% -0.252% -0.194% -0.215%
Panel C: Varying pSD
pSD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.010% -0.013% -0.001% -0.005%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.100% 0.105% 0.120% 0.174%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.090% -0.091% -0.120% -0.169%
Panel D: Varying pCD
pCD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.144% -0.120% -0.019% -0.009%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S -3.585% -3.637% -0.430% 0.137%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C 3.728% 3.757% 0.449% -0.127%
Table 3.4: Percentage dierence between the Kelly rule, , and the NPV
strategy, 1, in terms of total investment in IPOs, startups, and concerns.
The parameters of the dividend process can be found in Table 3.3. In
each panel, one parameter is varied. The strategies are calculated on the
assumption that the number of IPOs, startups, and concerns is equal to
their long-run averages of 1, E
 
nS

and E
 
nC

. The generalized Kelly
rule, , is obtained through 10,000 simulations over 1,000 time periods.
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not the case in the selected dividend model, but this strategy is still an
important benchmark. The case of  = 0 is special in that it relies only
on the current relative dividends. Therefore, this strategy is the called
current relative dividend strategy. Since it relies only on an extremely
short history, it may be in a strong position in a setup where not much
can be learnt from the past dividend history.
The last strategy diversies naively; it invests the same amount into
all existing assets. In other words,
5k;t
 
!t

=
1
Total number of active companies in t
:
This strategy may appear somewhat unsophisticated, but DeMiguel et al.
(2009) have showed that it performs astonishingly well on real data.
Obviously, many more strategies are possible. However, the gen-
eralized Kelly rule performs best in simulations within the i.i.d. and
stationary setting, whereas mean-variance, adaptive, and even more so-
phisticated strategies have no chance of surviving (see Hens et al. (2002),
Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004), and Tupak (2009)). Therefore, it makes
sense to examine mainly those strategies on the basis of relative divi-
dends, such as the generalized Kelly rule. To ensure that this inference
holds, Section 3.6.3 compares the NPV strategy with a large number of
xed-mix strategies and conrms that the NPV strategy is not only a
surviving strategy but, perhaps, also a locally evolutionary stable strat-
egy.
3.6 Simulations
The main purpose of this section is to simulate the wealth dynamic of
the competing investment strategies described above within the dividend
process detailed herein. This will be done using equation (3.10). First, a
simple example demonstrates the errors that can be produced by choos-
ing an inadequate strategy by wrongly assuming a stationary dividend
process. Second, simulations show that the NPV strategy is indeed able
to take over a large part of the market, and nally, some robustness
checks are performed on the NPV strategy.
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Figure 3.4: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out of
1,000 simulations over 1,000 time periods. The market comprises two
strategies: the historical relative dividend strategy averaged over the
previous 20 time periods and the naive strategy. All strategies begin
with equal wealth.
3.6.1 An illustrative example
With i.i.d. relative dividends, the Kelly rule  is equal to the average
past relative dividends, 3. This subsection shows that 3 is unable
to dominate the market under the dividend model of this paper with
nonstationary dividends and nitely lived assets, and it fails against the
naive strategy of investing the same amount into each asset, 5. In con-
trast to our paper, most of the literature assumes i.i.d. dividends with
innitely lived assets for their simulations (see, e.g., Hens et al. (2002),
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Hens and Schenk-Hoppe (2004), or Tupak (2009)); this questions the rel-
evance of these results. The dividend process is parameterized according
to Table 3.3. To emphasize the results of this section, pSC was set at
0.15 (as a consequence, pSS = 0:827). This example establishes that a
naive strategy that invests an equal share of wealth in every company
can accumulate more wealth than a strategy based on the average rel-
ative dividends of the previous 20 periods (see Figure 3.4). The two
strategies begin with equal wealth, and after 1,000 periods averaged out
over 1,000 simulations, the naive 1=n-strategy claims 58:5% of the to-
tal wealth, whereas the historical relative dividend strategy accounts for
41:5%.7 8 This result follows from the high probability that a startup
will become a concern, which the relative dividend investor, who invests
according to the past average relative dividends, neither knows nor takes
into account because the event is observed once in the life of a rm. In
contrast, the 1=n-strategy increases its wealth share by investing more
funds in startups than the relative dividend strategy does. Therefore,
both strategies will survive in the long run. However, parameterizations
calibrated on CRSP data show that the success of the nave investor in
the real world falls far short of the outcome achieved in this example.
The simulated parameters in Table 3.3 put the real-world probability of
a startup becoming a concern at a mere 0.7% (not 15%). This parameter
results in an average wealth share of just 6.2% for the 1=n-strategy after
1,000 periods. The simulations wherein pSC = 0:15 are an example of
how an optimal strategy may completely fail if a wrong dividend pro-
cess is assumed. Therefore, it is extremely important for evolutionary
simulations to assume a correctly specied dividend process.
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Figure 3.5: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out of
1,000 simulations over 10,000 time periods. The market comprises four
strategies: the theoretical NPV strategy, the current relative dividends
strategy, the historical relative dividend strategy averaged over the pre-
vious 20 time periods, and the naive strategy. All strategies begin with
equal wealth.
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3.6.2 Is the NPV strategy able to take over the mar-
ket?
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that an NPV strategy
will nally take over almost the entire market. To achieve this objec-
tive, the parameters given in Table 3.3 were used to simulate changes
in the wealth shares of the NPV, current relative dividend, historical
relative dividend, and naive strategies. This involved estimating the
mean and 95% condence intervals of the relative wealth of the com-
peting strategies on the basis of 1,000 simulations (see Figure 3.5). The
results conrm that the theoretical NPV strategy outperforms all the
other strategies to a striking extent. However, the strategies converge
very slowly compared to those used by Hens et al. (2002) and Hens and
Schenk-Hoppe (2004), who use i.i.d. dividend processes. In particular,
the current relative dividend strategy loses wealth shares so slowly that
after 1,000 periods, it still commands a larger market share than the
NPV strategy does. Given that the model was calibrated so that one
period equates to one year, this implies that evolutionary convergence
can require an extremely long time horizon, especially if the competing
strategies are not very dissimilar from the optimal one.
As mentioned earlier, a locally evolutionary stable strategy prevents
invading strategies from earning higher returns when it has almost all
the wealth in a market. Is the theoretical NPV strategy a locally evolu-
tionary stable strategy? This question is easily answered via simulation.
The process involves assuming that the theoretical NPV strategy begins
with 97% of total wealth and that the three other strategies each start
o with 1% of total wealth. On the basis of this assumption, 5,000 time
periods are then simulated 1,000 times in order to determine whether
the theoretical NPV strategy is able to retain its wealth share. The re-
sults of this procedure reveal that, after 5,000 periods, the theoretical
NPV strategy owns an average of 97.7% of total wealth, with a standard
7Increasing the number of time periods to 5,000 (the default number of time
periods in the rest of the paper) does not have a signicant impact on the result.
8The simulations of the whole paper were also done with 100 simulations. The
impact on average wealth, the main variable of interest, is minor. The only visible
dierence was that the condence bands became smoother with 1,000 simulations.
An even higher number of simulations is therefore unlikely to alter the results.
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Figure 3.6: The relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals of
1,000 simulations of 5,000 time periods. The market comprises four
strategies: the empirical NPV strategy, the current relative dividends
strategy, the historical relative dividend strategy averaged over 100 pe-
riods, and the nave strategy. All strategies start with equal wealth.
deviation of 0.9%. In contrast, the current relative dividend strategy
accrues an average of 1.3% of total wealth with a standard deviation of
0.6%. The simulated distribution of the latters increase in wealth shows
that it is not statistically signicant at the 5% level. In other words,
strategies with small total wealth shares are not able to wrest market
share away from the theoretical NPV strategy. Therefore, the theoretical
NPV strategy is evolutionary stable, at least against the chosen alterna-
tive strategies.
The wealth shares of the NPV strategy should also be determined
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using dividend parameters that are estimated from simulated dividend
data, that is, the empirical NPV strategy. To this end, the parameters
of the dividend process must be estimated over a sucient number of
time periods to ensure that the parameter values are precise enough. For
example, if the parameters for calculating the empirical NPV strategy
are determined on the basis of the previous 20 periods at every point
of time, then the empirical strategy would be vanquished by the cur-
rent relative dividend strategy. Starting with 97% of total wealth, the
wealth share of the empirical NPV strategy would fall to an average of
57.0% of total wealth after 5,000 periods simulated 1,000 times each.
Conversely, the wealth share of the current relative dividends strategy
would expand from 1% to 28.5% of total wealth, and the historical rela-
tive dividends strategy and the naive strategy would gain 5.3% and 7.2%
of additional wealth share, respectively. Figure 3.6 depicts the results
of simulations using parameters obtained on the basis of the previous
100 periods. Both the empirical NPV and historical relative dividend
strategies are now determined over the previous 100 periods so that the
learning horizon remains consistent between them. In the same setup,
the empirical NPV strategy acquires 98.0% of total wealth after 5,000
periods. All other strategies lose in wealth share aside from the rela-
tive dividend strategy, whose wealth share grows fractionally from 1%
to 1.1%. In contrast to the results generated by parameters estimated
from the previous 20 periods, these results show that the empirical NPV
strategy easily conquers the other strategies when parameters calculated
from the previous 100 periods are used. However, the empirical NPV
strategy converges at a slower pace than it does in the simulations for
the theoretical NPV strategy. This leads to the conclusion that, by
denition, an imprecise estimation of the correct parameters aects the
performance of the empirical NPV strategy, in some cases so much that
the empirical NPV strategy has no chance to survive. This concurs with
Tupak (2009), who nds that other strategies can perform better than
 if the latter must be learnt from the data. For innitely lived as-
sets and strategies that depend only on the state of the world, Theorem
2 of Amir et al. (2009a) implies that the optimal strategy learnt from
the data must not survive against the optimal strategy that knows the
true model parameters, that is, other strategies may triumph over the
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Figure 3.7: The full line indicates the wealth share of xed-mix strategies
investing a constant share of wealth into concerns as averaged over 1,000
simulations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence interval of
the strategies. The percentage of investment in concerns is shown on
the x-axis. The percentage of investment in IPOs holds steady at 0.2%
of the total investment and the remainder is invested in startups. The
dashed line represents the initial wealth share.
estimated optimal strategy. The simulations by DeMiguel et al. (2009)
showed that thousands of monthly observations are required before an
optimal mean-variance strategy featuring asset returns that possess a
multivariate normal distribution can overcome the naive 1=n strategy.
This is mainly because the estimated average returns of the strategies
contain a high level of error. Thus, the implementation of the theoreti-
cal optimal strategy may remain a challenge because of the errors in the
estimation of the dividend process.
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
Obviously, the set of strategies in the market can greatly inuence the
outcome; therefore, the NPV strategy should be tested against as many
other strategies as practicable in order to conrm the ndings presented
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above. This was accomplished by further running the theoretical NPV
strategy against a wide range of xed-mix strategies. The fraction of
funds invested in IPOs was assumed constant at 0.2% of total invest-
ment, which is the rounded average value of the NPV strategy if the
number of companies is given by the long-run average dened in equa-
tion (3.1). Total investment in concerns was varied between 0% and
99.8% of total investment and was calculated using quantities that dif-
fered by 0.1% from each other. This investment was equally divided
between all concerns and the rest of the investment was equally divided
between all startups. This resulted in the creation of 998 dierent xed-
mix strategies to compete with the NPV strategies in the market. The
theoretical NPV strategy started with 97% of total wealth with the rest
divided equally among the xed-mix strategies.9 Figure 3.6.3 shows the
average wealth share of the various xed-mix strategies after 5,000 peri-
ods simulated 1,000 times each. The dashed line represents the average
wealth share of these strategies in the rst period. Fixed-mix strategies
that invested less than 90.8% into concerns lose in average market share,
while other xed-mix strategies gain. Overall, the NPV strategy is able
to increase its wealth share and ends up with 99.3% of total wealth.
Naturally, the gains of the xed-mix strategies that invested heavily in
concerns are obtained at the expense of the xed-mix strategies that
invested limited amounts in concerns. To compare the successful xed-
mix strategies with the NPV strategies, all xed-mix strategies that had
gained in average wealth shares (i.e., those that invested 90.8% or more
of their total wealth in concerns) were then matched against the NPV
strategy. As before, all strategies involved were simulated 1,000 times
per period over 5,000 periods. After 5,000 periods, the NPV strategy
amasses a wealth share of 96.9%. The 95% condence band rises from
93.9% to 98.6%, indicating that the initial wealth of the strategy does
not dier statistically from the nal wealth. In contrast, none of the
xed-mix strategies with a 95% condence interval are able to gain a
statistically signicant proportion of wealth shares and their wins or
losses more or less amount to zero (see Figure 3.7(b)). Overall, no xed-
9This percentage was chosen to make the setup comparable with that delineated
in Section 3.6.2. With an initial wealth of 90% of the theoretical NPV strategies, the
results are comparable and the theoretical NPV strategy gains massively in wealth
shares.
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mix strategy is able to push the NPV strategy out of the market. On
the other hand, the NPV strategy is also unable to push the xed-mix
strategies completely out of the market (although the wealth share of the
latter is small). This evinces that the NPV strategy is a very close ap-
proximation to the real dominant strategy but is not itself the dominant
strategy (given that such a strategy exists at all).
The results obtained in the previous section may dier according to
variations in model parameters. Therefore, I ran additional tests in or-
der to evaluate the main hypothesis that the NPV strategy is locally
evolutionary stable compared with the current relative dividend, histor-
ical relative dividend, and naive investment strategies. This was done
by estimating the aforementioned strategies with several dierent sets
of parameterizations and examining the stability of the results thereby
obtained. The NPV strategy was simulated with parameters calculated
from the previous 100 periods and an initial wealth share of 97% and
allocated the other strategies 1% each of wealth share. The results show
increases in the wealth share of the empirical NPV strategy averaged
out over 1,000 simulations over 5,000 time periods (see Table 3.5) and
shows that this strategy can increase its relative weight under dierent
parameterizations. This suggests that the NPV strategy can survive the
evolutionary timeline with a large share of wealth and may therefore be
at least close to a locally evolutionary stable strategy.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that large dividend jumps and the creation,
growth, and default of companies are very important aspects of the div-
idend process. The idealized model presented herein shows that these
factors have considerable inuence on the performance of dierent in-
vestment strategies and signies the inadequacy of considering only the
time series of any given company in determining the percentage of wealth
that should be invested into that company. Rather, these ndings sug-
gest that comparable companies should be studied in order to determine
the optimal portfolio weight of companies. This is a new idea that com-
plicates many aspects of evolutionary nance, including the estimation of
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Emp. Current Historical Naive
NPV rel. div. rel. div. investor
Initial relative wealth 0.970 0.010 0.010 0.010
Benchmark 0.980 0.011 0.000 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
0 = 10% 0.982 0.012 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 10 0.975 0.013 0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 100 0.984 0.009 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
nnew = 5 0.978 0.012 0.002 0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
pCC = 98% 0.977 0.017 0.000 0.006
pCD = 2% (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006)
pSC = 2:0% 0.972 0.013 0.006 0.009
pSS = 95:7% (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pSD = 5:0% 0.973 0.015 0.000 0.011
pSS = 92:3% (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Table 3.5: The average relative wealth shares of the four main strate-
gies after 1,000 simulations of 5,000 periods. The gures in parentheses
express the standard deviations of the given percentages. The market
comprises four investors: the empirical NPV investor (learning over 100
periods), the current relative dividends investor, the historical relative
dividend investor averaging over 100 time periods, and the naive in-
vestor. Eight models were estimated: the benchmark model, which was
calculated according to the parameterizations in Table 3.3, and seven
other models wherein one parameter has been dierent compared to the
benchmark model. The varied parameter and its new value can be found
in the leftmost column.
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an appropriate dividend model, and constitutes an important drawback:
even very primitive strategies can outperform the most elaborate ones
if a huge amount of data is required to estimate them accurately. Nev-
ertheless, the NPV strategy, a close substitute of the generalized Kelly
rule, dominates within this setup, although it requires long time periods
to approximate a 100% wealth share. Alternatively, this result could
also indicate that the strategy that is able to achieve the most precise
calculations of the fundamental value of a rms dividends will be the one
to survive or even dominate the market in the long run.
Simulation studies, such as this one, inherently face one major is-
sue: it is never possible to test the whole range of possible parameters.
Therefore, even with the extensive robustness checks carried out within
the paper, there is no guarantee that the results found can be general-
ized for all cases. Furthermore, the Kelly strategy does not generalize
to the chosen setup and must be approximated by the NPV strategy.
Therefore, the present paper provides only a rough approximation of an
evolutionary stable strategy.
This study generates three interesting directions for future research.
First, theoretical results pertaining to nonstationary dividends and nitely
lived rms would ascertain whether the results provided by simulations
in this paper are generally applicable. Second, future work could perform
simulations on the basis of alternative stochastic dividend processes in
order to investigate the impact of such processes on the surviving strat-
egy. Third, this paper has shown that the learning period may wield a
crucial inuence on strategy performance. Therefore, future work could
attempt to determine how the dividend process should be learned opti-
mally, such that the optimal strategy based on those results is able to
take over the market.
Bibliography
Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Klaus Reiner
Schenk-Hoppe. Market Selection and Survival of Investment Strate-
gies. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41(1-2):105{122, February
2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 3-37
Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Le Xu. Evolu-
tionary Finance and Dynamic Games. Working Paper 581, NCCR
"Financial Valuation and Risk Management", September 2009a.
Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe. Asset
Market Games of Survival. Working Paper 505, NCCR "Financial
Valuation and Risk Management", September 2009b.
Larry Blume and David Easley. If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You
Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets. Econo-
metrica, 74(4):929{966, November 2006.
Lawrence Blume and David Easley. Evolution and Market Behavior.
Journal of Economic Theory, 58(1):9{40, July 1992.
John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller. Cointegration and Tests of
Present Value Models. Journal of Political Economy, 95(5):1062{88,
October 1987.
John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller. The Dividend-Price Ratio and
Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount Factors. Review of
Financial Studies, 1(3):195{228, 1988.
Sudheer Chava and Robert A. Jarrow. Bankruptcy Prediction with In-
dustry Eects. Review of Finance, 8(4):537{569, 2004.
Hui Chen. Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads
and Capital Structure. Journal of Finance, forthcoming, 2010.
Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo. The Irrelevance of the MM Div-
idend Irrelevance Theorem. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2):
293{315, February 2006.
Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo, and Rene M. Stulz. Dividend Policy
and the Earned / Contributed Capital Mix: A Test of the Life-Cycle
Theory. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(2):227{254, August 2006.
David N. DeJong and Charles H. Whiteman. The Temporal Stability of
Dividends and Stock Prices: Evidence from the Likelihood Function.
American Economic Review, 81(3):600{617, June 1991.
3-38 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Victor DeMiguel, Lorenzo Garlappi, and Raman Uppal. Optimal Versus
Naive Diversication: How Inecient is the 1-N Portfolio Strategy?
Review of Financial Studies, 22(5):1915{1953, May 2009.
Rajeev Dhawan. Firm Size and Productivity Dierential: Theory and
Evidence from a Panel of US Firms. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 44(3):269{293, March 2001.
David S. Evans. Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth. Journal
of Political Economy, 95(4):657{674, August 1987a.
David S. Evans. The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size, and Age:
Estimates for 100 Manufacturing Industries. Journal of Industrial
Economics, 35(4):567{581, June 1987b.
Igor Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe. Mar-
ket Selection of Financial Trading Strategies: Global Stability. Math-
ematical Finance, 12(4):329{339, October 2002.
Igor Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe. Evo-
lutionary Stable Stock Markets. Economic Theory, 27(2):449{468,
January 2006.
Igor V. Evstigneev, Thorsten Hens, and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe.
Globally Evolutionarily Stable Portfolio Rules. Journal of Economic
Theory, 140(1):197 { 228, 2008.
Eugene F. Fama. The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices. Journal of
Business, 38(1):34{105, January 1965.
Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French. Disappearing Dividends:
Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay? Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 60(1):3{43, April 2001.
Milton Friedman. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953.
Gustavo Grullon, Roni Michaely, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan. Are
Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity? Journal of Business, 75
(3):387{424, July 2002.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 3-39
Bronwyn H. Hall. The Relationship between Firm Size and Firm Growth
in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector. Journal of Industrial Economics,
35(4):583{606, June 1987.
Richard D. F. Harris and Elias Tzavalis. Testing for Unit Roots in Dy-
namic Panels in the Presence of a Deterministic Trend: Re-Examining
the Unit Root Hypothesis for Real Stock Prices and Dividends. Econo-
metric Reviews, 23(2):149{166, January 2004.
Thorsten Hens and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe. Survival of the Fittest
on Wall Street. Working Paper 151, NCCR Finrisk, February 2004.
Thorsten Hens and Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe. Evolutionary Stability
of Portfolio Rules in Incomplete Markets. Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 41(1-2):43{66, February 2005.
Thorsten Hens, Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppe, and Martin Stalder. An Ap-
plication of Evolutionary Finance to Firms Listed in the Swiss Market
Index. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 138(4):465{487,
2002.
William J. Hurley and Lewis D. Johnson. A Realistic Dividend Valuation
Model. Financial Analysts Journal, 50(3):50{54, July/August 1994.
Roger G. Ibbotson and Jerey F. Jae. "Hot Issue"Markets. Journal of
Finance, 30(4):1027{1042, September 1975.
John L. Kelly. A New Interpretation of Information Rate. Bell System
Technical Journal, 35:917{926, July 1956.
Allan W. Kleidon. Variance Bounds Tests and Stock Price Valuation
Models. Journal of Political Economy, 94(5):953{1001, October 1986.
J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and
Robert J. Waldmann. Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and
Destabilizing Rational Speculation. Journal of Finance, 45(2):374{97,
June 1990.
Dennis C. Mueller. A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm. Journal of Indus-
trial Economics, 20(3):199{219, July 1972.
40 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lubos Pastor and Pietro Veronesi. Rational IPO Waves. Journal of
Finance, 60(4):1713{1757, August 2005.
Paul A. Samuelson. Evolution and Market Behavior. Journal of Banking
& Finance, 3(4):305{307, December 1979.
Alvaro Sandroni. Do Markets Favor Agents Able to Make Accurate
Predicitions? Econometrica, 68(6):1303{1342, November 2000.
Robert J. Shiller. The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market
Eciency. Journal of Finance, 36(2):291{304, May 1981.
Andreas Tupak. Essays in Numerical Evolutionary Finance. PhD thesis,
University of Zurich, 2009.
Maria Vassalou and Yuhang Xing. Default Risk in Equity Returns. Jour-
nal of Finance, 59(2):831{868, April 2004.
Appendix A
Curriculum Vitae
A-1
A-2 APPENDIX A. CURRICULUM VITAE
Name Urs Schweri
Date of Birth 18. February 1977
Habitat Siglistorf AG
Email urs.schweri@uschweri.ch
Education
2004{2010 University of Zurich,
Swiss Finance Institute PhD Program in
Finance
1998{2004 University of Zurich,
Major in Economics (lic. oec. publ.),
Main emphasis in econometrics
1994{1998 Kantonsschule at Baden,
Maturity Type C,
Main emphasis on science
1984{1994 Primary School, Sekundarschule and
Bezirksschule at Spreitenbach
Professional Experience
2009{ Zurich Financial Services,
Investment Management,
Market Strategy and Macroeconomics
Part-time
2005{ University of Zurich,
Chair of Prof. Hens (Financial Economics)
Assistant
2002{2005 University of Zurich,
Chair of Prof. Garbers (Econometrics)
Assistant
1999{2002 UBS Switzerland,
Controlling & Finance,
Internship and later part-time 10 %
1998 UBS Switzerland, IT,
Internship
